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ARTICLE
WHAT IS "TECHNOLOGY"?
EMILY MICHIKO MORRIS4
ABSTRACT
Patent protection is limited to "technology," but technology is so difficult to
define that the Supreme Court has taken up the issue several times in the last
several years. The Supreme Court's recent decisions in Bilski, Prometheus, and
Myriad have left patentable subject matter doctrine just as confused as ever,
however. What is patentable technology?
The answer turns out to have nothing to do with the various pragmatic
rationales that courts commonly cite. Rather, the patent system has defined
patentable technology according to much simpler criteria - artifice and action.
Artifice is the quality of being created by humans, not by nature. Action is the
quality of behaving or operating in some active way. Together, artifice plus
action explain and, perhaps more importantly, unify the law on patentable
subject matter. By focusing on artifice plus action as the primary criteria
defining patentable technology, the patent system can provide clearer
guidelines than it has been able to achieve thus far.
INTRODUCTION
In the last several years, the Supreme Court has taken on an unusually large
number of patent law cases, a testament to the growing importance of patents
in the modem economy. The patent system is designed to encourage the
4 Associate Professor and Dean's Fellow, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School
of Law, Indianapolis, I.N. Many thanks to Bernard Chao, Kevin Collins, Greg Dolin, Yaniv
Heled, Cynthia Ho, Jay Kesan, Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Josh Sarnoff and Greg Vetter for their
helpful comments; the participants at the 2012 Intellectual Property Scholars Roundtable at
Drake University Law School; the participants at the December 9, 2012 Junior Faculty
Regional Workshop at Washington University School of Law; the faculty of the Chase
College of Law at Northern Kentucky University; the participants of the 2010 Intellectual
Property Scholars Conference at the Berkeley Center for Law & Technology in Berkeley;
and the participants at the 2010 Sanford T. Kolb Intellectual Property Law Conference, Bar-
Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel. Special thanks also to Susan David deMaine and Miriam
Murphy for their expert editing, and to Elisa Doll '13, Katie Haire '13, Morgan Lincoln '12,
and Stephen Reed '13, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law, for their
exceptional research assistance.
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"useful Arts" - or what modem language would refer to as the "technological
arts." New technologies can cost thousands or even millions of dollars to
develop, but patents on those technologies can be worth millions or even
billions of dollars. Whether any particular technological innovation qualifies as
patentable subject matter therefore can be critical in deciding whether to invest
in its research and development. An ideal patent system would most efficiently
promote and protect such investments in new technologies by making clear
what subject matter is eligible for patent protection.
Patentable subject matter is a confusing area of law in need of clarity.
Despite its long history, the U.S. patent system has never been able to provide
a precise definition of what "technology" means within the context of patent
law. The existing broad categories of included and excluded subject matter are
vague, and the rationales and tests proffered thus far for distinguishing
between the two have resulted only in further confusion. The Supreme Court
itself has revisited the subject of patentable subject matter at least three times
in as many years, but to little avail.' Patentable subject matter has proven so
messy that some commentators go so far as to call for an end to the inquiry
altogether, suggesting instead that we rely on other patentability requirements,
such as utility and novelty, to distinguish patentable from unpatentable
technology.2
Nonetheless, within the courts' repeated attempts to define technology are
two surprisingly consistent concepts that characterize all patentable subject
matter - the concepts of artifice and action. All patentable subject matter
displays some threshold degree of artifice, roughly defined as perceived degree
of alteration through human intervention. Likewise, all patentable subject
matter must also display at least a threshold degree of action, roughly defined
as new operation or activity through human intervention. Together, artifice and
action explain and, perhaps more importantly, unify the law on patentable
subject matter.
Explicitly adopting artifice and action as the standard for patentable
technology offers a number of benefits. The artifice-plus-action standard
allows patent law to move away from wrangling over what an "abstract idea"
or "process" is or from deciding whether an invention is truly a machine or just
cleverly claimed as such.
Moreover, applying artifice plus action as a standard takes into account the
fact that both artifice and action exist as continuous characteristics lying along
a spectrum. Acknowledging the scalar quality of both artifice and action allows
' Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. (Myriad II), 133 S. Ct. 2107
(2013); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012); Bilski v.
Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010).
2 Kristen Osenga, Ants, Elephant Guns, and Statutory Subject Matter, 39 ARIz. ST. L.J.
1087 (2007); Michael Risch, Everything Is Patentable, 75 TENN. L. REV. 591 (2007); David
Kappos, USPTO, Some Thoughts on Patentability (July 27, 2012, 2:09 PM),
http://www.uspto.gov/blog/director/entry/some-thoughts-on-patentability.
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the patent system to adapt to new technologies without resorting to the kinds of
efforts as bright-line rules that have led patentable subject matter doctrine
astray.
Finally, by directly adopting an artifice-plus-action standard, perhaps patent
law can achieve a more transparent and therefore more predictable definition
of patentable subject matter without abandoning decades of existing case law
or the expectation interests that case law has engendered.
This is not to say that an artifice-plus-action standard would solve all of
patentable subject matter's problems. Standards themselves are often vague,
and an artifice-plus-action standard would require courts to make many
judgment calls about where along the spectrum of artifice and action any given
invention must fall before it can be considered patentable technology. Such
line-drawing is a characteristic of many concepts in patent law, however, and
is a task in which the courts have had to develop some competence.'
An artifice-plus-action standard also cannot guarantee the "right answers" in
terms of what would most efficiently "promote progress in useful Arts." How
best to draw the bounds of patentable subject matter to incentivize innovation
is a difficult and perhaps unanswerable question. Adopting as clear and
consistent an approach as possible is often more important than getting the
"right answer," as clarity and predictability are at least as important as any
other practical concern in the efficient administration of the patent system.
Section I of this Article introduces the problems of how patentable subject
matter has been defined thus far, and Section II introduces the concepts of
artifice and action and explains how artifice plus action consistently define the
patent system's interpretation of both the statutorily included and judicially
excluded categories of subject matter. Section III then applies the artifice-plus-
action standard to some of the trickier areas of patentable subject matter, such
as business methods, diagnostic methods, genetic material, and computer
software. This Section also discusses some of the potential costs of using
artifice plus action as a standard for patentable subject matter but argues that
the benefits likely outweigh these costs.
THE PROBLEM OF PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER
Courts generally describe patentable subject matter restrictions as a
threshold limitation on what may be granted patent protection. 4 Patents rights
are in many ways property-like entitlements. Like property rights, a patent
provides the right to exclude; that right is to exclude all others from making,
using, selling, or offering to sell the patented invention for a limited period of
See infra notes 279-286 and accompanying text.
4 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225; David S. Olson, Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law
Seriously: The Case for Restricting Patentable Subject Matter, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 181, 184
(2009); Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection for
Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025, 1042,
1043 (1990).
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time. Patents in turn help to incentivize investments in developing patentable
inventions by excluding others from potentially free-riding on that investment.5
To define what a patent is, however, does not define what subject matter a
patent may cover. Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution authorizes Congress
to implement a patent system "[tlo promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts."6
At the time of drafting, the term "useful Arts" referred to the mechanical,
industrial, and manual arts, 7 or what in modem English are the technological
arts.8
Unfortunately, simply translating "useful Arts" into its modem-day
synonym has provided little clarity. Although most of us have an intuitive
sense of what technology is, articulating that sense in a rigorous manner that
can be applied in a court of law is extremely difficult. As the Federal Circuit9
noted in its recent decision in In re Bilski, "technology" and "technological
arts" are ambiguous terms that can change with context.10 As the United States
Patent & Trademark Office ("PTO") once explained, "[A]ny attempts to define
what is 'in the technological arts' raises more questions tha[n] it appears to
answer."" Despite its predecessor court's brief flirtation with looking at
whether an invention was within the "technological arts" as a patentable
subject matter standard,12 the Federal Circuit ultimately rejected the
5 Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 247
(1994); Olson, supra note 4, at 192-93.
6 U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8.
Robert 1. Coulter, The Field of the Statutory Useful Arts, 34 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 487,
496 (1952); Karl B. Lutz, Patents and Science: A Clarification of the Patent Clause of the
U.S. Constitution, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 50, 50-55 (1949-1950); see generally Edward C.
Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The Background and
Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States Constitution, 2 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 1 (1994).
8 See, e.g., Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3244 (Stevens, J., concurring); In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d
967, 976-77 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en
banc); In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 958 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (vacated on other grounds); In re
Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 893 (C.C.P.A. 1970); see also Alan L. Durham, "Useful Arts" in
the Information Age, 1999 B.Y.U.L. REV. 1419, 1419-20, 1419-1420; Lutz, supra note 7, at
54.
1 Founded in 1982 as the successor to the Court of Claims and Patent Appeals, the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over cases "relating to
patents." 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012).
Io In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 960 (Fed. Cir. 2008). For convenience, however, the
following discussion refers to "patentable technology" not as a criterion for identifying
patentable subject matter, but as synonymous with "useful Arts."
" Interim Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications for Patent Subject Matter
Eligibility, 1300 OFFICIAL GAz. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 1, 44 (Oct. 26, 2005), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/preognotice/guidelinesl01_20051026.pdf.
12 In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682 (C.C.P.A. 1971); Musgrave, 431 F.2d at 893.
2014] 27
B. U. J. SCI. & TECH. L.
technological-arts test as unworkably vague.' 3
Both the Patent Act and judicial precedent therefore have interpreted the
Constitution's reference to the "useful Arts" as categories of inclusion and
categories of exclusion. Section 101 of the Patent Act states that patents may
cover "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter."14 The Patent Act fails to define "process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter" with any specificity, however. Courts have instead
interpreted Section 101 largely by negative implication, stating that patentable
subject matter does not include "laws of nature," "phenomena of nature" (also
referred to as "physical phenomena"), and "abstract ideas,"' 5 categories that
are themselves frustratingly vague.16 The courts seldom attempt to define each
category or even specify into which category a patentable invention falls,
focusing instead on the more general question of whether the invention is
patentable subject matter vel non.17
But that still leaves the question: what is patentable subject matter? What is
technology? As argued elsewhere, courts' approaches to patentable subject
matter turn out to be mostly intuitive - that is, patentable subject matter based
not so much on economic rationales or even judicial precedent as it is on an
underlying instinct about what constitutes technology.' 8 This Article takes that
analysis a step further to point out that the instinct behind patentable subject
matter can be distilled into two specific themes: artifice and action.
Specifically, patentable technology must be the product of human-mediated
changes, or what the analysis below refers to as "artifice." Artifice alone is not
sufficient, however; patentable technology cannot merely exist but must
instead be given some new action or operation, a quality the analysis below
refers to simply as "action." The following Section introduces the concepts of
artifice and action in more detail.
THE THEMES OF ARTIFICE AND ACTION
Artifice and action are strong motivating currents throughout patentable
subject matter discussions and are themes often touched upon in case law and
commentary. Although the concepts of artifice and action will likely sound
13 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1015.
14 35 U. S. C. § 101(2011).
15 See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3221 (2010) (citing Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)) (stating that there are three categories of exclusion).
These common-law exceptions reputedly date back at least 150 years. Id. at 3221 (citing Le
Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156 (1853)).
16 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 219 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1 In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Linn, J., dissenting); Risch, supra
note 2, at 658.
'8 See generally Emily Michiko Morris, Intuitive Patenting (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author).
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familiar, 19 the case law on patentable subject matter seldom mentions artifice
and action explicitly. Part II.A. therefore provides general definitions for
artifice and action to introduce how these concepts are used in this Article. Part
II.B. then provides proof of the artifice and action concepts and more rigorous
explanations of each.
Artifice and Action Defined
Artifice
The concept of "artifice" is an easily recognizable motif in patentable
subject matter. 20 Patent law prohibits patents on naturally occurring
phenomena and laws of nature; as the Supreme Court stated, statutory subject
matter is instead limited to inventions that are "human-made" and "a product
of human ingenuity." 21 Patentable subject matter thus includes only that which
is a "non-naturally occurring manufacture or composition," - something other
than a spontaneously arising phenomenon - that possesses "markedly different
characteristics from any found in nature." 22
The term "artifice" captures this quality nicely. Artifice refers to the
products of human skill, as opposed to naturally occurring products;23 its
cognate adjectival form, "artificial," is similarly defined as anything humanly
contrived, human-made, caused, or produced by a human and therefore
"lacking in natural or spontaneous quality." 24 Along the same vein, artifice
refers to the art, skill, and ingenuity necessary to create human-made artifacts,
qualities commonly associated with patentable technology.25 Artifice also
derives from the constitutional mandate that patents be granted to "useful
Arts," for "art" refers to "the exercise of human skill, as distinguished from
19 See generally Daniel J. Klein, The Integrity of Section 101: A "New and Useful" Test
for Patentable Subject Matter, 93 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 287 (2011).
20 See, e.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 592 (1978) (referring to this concept as
"inventiveness"); John M. Conley & Robert Makowski, Back to the Future: Rethinking the
Product of Nature Doctrine as a Barrier to Biotechnology Patents, 85 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 301, 379 (2003) (noting "fairly consistent requirement that . . . a
claimed invention with a natural precursor or variant must differ in some substantial and
material way from the natural version"); Joshua D. Sarnoff, Patent-Eligible Inventions After
Bilski: History and Theory, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 53,passim (2011) (referring to this concept as
"creativity").
21 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980); Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S.
609, 615 (1887).
22 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309-10.
23 Artifice Definition, SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 124 (5th ed. 2002).
24 Artificial Definition, MERRIAM WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/artificial (last visited April 29, 2013).
25 Artifice Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/ browse/artifice
(last visited April 29, 2013).
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nature." 26 Inventions that display artifice therefore are new and distinguishable
from phenomena that occur naturally, without human intervention. In this way
artifice reflects Section 101's restriction of patentable subject matter to "new
and useful" processes, machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter. 27
Artifice requires more than human intervention alone, however. First of all,
human activity and thought are not themselves "inventions" but rather means
to invention. Technology is not the fact of human intervention but rather the
subject matter affected or transformed by such human intervention. That is not
to say that devices or even processes involving steps that could otherwise be
performed by a human are unpatentable; as long as human-made elements
perform some significant part of the overall function of the claimed invention,
the invention may qualify as patentable subject matter.28 Alleged inventions
involving primarily human activity or thought itself, on the other hand, are
generally unpatentable subject matter.29
Artifice is thus a scalar quality, and patentable artifice is a matter of
degree. 30 The more the elements of an invention are changed from their
naturally occurring forms, the more "artificial" and therefore patentable the
invention will be. Inventions therefore lie along an entire spectrum of artifice,
depending on how many naturally occurring elements they include and how
much those elements have been altered from their natural state. At one end are
inventions that clearly possess such "markedly different characteristics from
any found in nature" that no analogous natural phenomenon can even be
argued to exist.31 Inventions at this end of the spectrum easily satisfy the
artifice requirement. At the other end of the spectrum lie things so closely
related to nature as to be almost indistinguishable; this latter group displays
little or no patentable artifice at all. Most inventions range between the two
extremes, but exactly where along that spectrum an invention displays
adequate artifice is not easy to pinpoint.
At first glance, artifice might seem to overlap with patent law's novelty
requirement. Artifice differs from novelty in several significant ways,
however, and "new" within the meaning of Section 101 requires something
different than novelty under Section 102.32 Novelty, both in the previous Patent
26 Art Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/art?s=t (last visited
April 29, 2013).
27 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2013).
28 See, e.g., In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Alco Std. Corp. v.
Tennessee Valley Auth., 808 F.2d 1490, 1496, (Fed. Cir. 1987).
29 See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3226 (2010); In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d at
980.
30 See Samoff, supra note 20, at 59-60 (referring to "degrees of creativity").
31 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980).
32 See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 189 (1981); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo
Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948); see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Wisdom of the
Ages or Dead-Hand Control? Patentable Subject Matter for Diagnostic Methods After In re
30 [Vol. 20:24
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Act and the new America Invents Act, looks only at whether others had
previously made the claimed invention available to the public through "prior
art" such as patents, printed publications, offers for sale, or public knowledge
or use.33 Artifice, by contrast, looks at whether the claimed invention
previously existed at all. Newly identified laws of nature or phenomena of
nature meet the novelty requirement if never previously identified in prior art.
Laws and phenomena of nature by definition can never meet the artifice
requirement, however, because they pre-exist human intervention and are not
"made by man."
Although some judicial opinions might suggest otherwise, artifice should
also not be confused with obviousness. Artifice is not a matter of the ingenuity
or genius of the human intervention necessary to create an invention, nor is it a
matter of how much experimentation or other intervention is necessary.
Artifice is purely a matter of the degree of alteration or difference from
naturally occurring phenomena.
Action
The other, somewhat less obvious motif running through patentable subject
matter doctrine is "action." The patent system is often described as covering
"functional" things that accomplish useful tasks.34 Patentable subject matter
requires more than just functionality and usefulness, however. Rather,
patentability depends not just on whether an invention is useful but also on
whether it is useful in a way cognizable under the Patent Act;35 only "when [a
claimed invention] is performing a function which the patent laws were
designed to protect (e.g., transforming or reducing an article to a different state
or thing), then the claim satisfies the requirements of § 101."36
What kind of function or utility are the patent laws designed to protect?
Patent law has been notoriously vague on this point. This Article shows that
the kind of function that qualifies for patent protection nonetheless has been
fairly consistent. In order to qualify as technology, inventions must be actively
Bilski, 3 CASE W. RESERVE J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 1, 54-55 (2012).
33 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (e), (g) (novelty under the 1952 Patent Act revisions); 35 U.S.C. §
102(a) (2013), amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub.L. No. 112-29, § 3, 125
Stat. 284-341 (2011) (novelty under the America Invents Act).
34 See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 TEX. L. REv. 99, 136 (2000); Vincent
Chiappetta, Patentability of Computer Software Instruction as an "Article of Manufacture: "
Software as Such as the Right Stuff 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 89, 106
(1998); Dennis S. Karjala, A Coherent Theory for the Copyright Protection of Computer
Software and Recent Judicial Interpretations, 66 U. CIN. L. REv. 53, 56 (1997).
3 Dennis S. Karjala, Distinguishing Patent and Copyright Subject Matter, 35 CONN. L.
REV. 439, 448-49 (2003).
36 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192; accord AT&T Corp. v. Excel Comm., Inc., 172 F.3d 1352,
1358-59 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Although the utility requirement also stems in part from the "new
and useful" language of § 101, the Court here was referring to the patentable subject matter
limitations of Section 101.
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rather than passively useful; a patentable invention achieves its intended utility
only by actively operating, behaving, performing, or otherwise acting in some
manner. As the discussion below shows, a seldom recognized but implicit
requirement for patentability is that a claimed invention should actively do
something. Inert creations that passively exist display no patentable action.
The term "action" as used here reflects this quality of active operation. The
dictionary defines "action" as a "process or state of being active," and
"something done or performed."37 Action is also synonymous with "operation"
or "process[] or manner of functioning or operating; exertion of force, power,
or influence; process of practical or mechanical nature in some form of work or
production." 38 Both action and operation are thus related to the verb form of
"function:" "to perform a specified action or activity; work; operate." 39
Beyond synonyms, however, patentable action is difficult to define.40
Patentable action takes an almost infinite variety of forms, much as the patent
system must cover a wide variety of technologies. A few categories of
functionality and use nonetheless clearly do not qualify as patentable action.
First, primarily informational or expressive works are unpatentably
inactive. 41 This makes intuitive sense. While often quite useful, information
and expression are not "self-executing" works and instead must be applied in
order to create utility;42 without such application, information and expression
by themselves are functionally inert. Likewise, information on how to perform
a function is unpatentable subject matter because mere instructions for human
action do not themselves perform any activity.43 Because information and
expression can exist within the human consciousness, courts often characterize
attempts to patent information or expression as effectively attempts to patent
human thought, a category of excluded activity discussed below.
Outside of information qua information, however, courts seem somewhat
less leery of allowing patents on inventions that involve information and even
expression. 44 Courts have long considered inventions that convey, store, or
display information or expression to be patentable subject matter, as long as
3 Action Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/action?s=t
(last visited Apr. 29, 2013).
38 Operation Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/operation
(last visited Nov. 28, 2013).
39 Function, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/function?s=t (last
visited Apr. 29, 2013).
40 Cf Emily Michiko Morris, Res or Rules: Patents and the (Uncertain) Rules of the
Game, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 481, 495-97 (2011) (noting difficulties of
describing an invention's function with precision and clarity).
41 See Karjala, Distinguishing Patent, supra note 35, at 448-49.
42 Id. at 452.
43 Id.
I Kevin Emerson Collins, Claims to Information Qua Information and a Structural
Theory of Section 101, 4 J.L. & POL'Y LS 11 (2008) (coining the phrase "information qua
information").
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their sole distinguishing characteristic is not the information or expression they
carry, store, or display.45 If a work is not specific information or expression
itself but rather a means for displaying, conveying, or storing the information,
the work is patentably active.
A second category of unpatentably inactive works covers those that are
primarily human activity. In much the same way that the artifice requirement
looks only at the object of human intervention and not at human intervention
itself, action looks only at the operativity of that object and not at the human
activity that created it. Again, human action is not itself technology but rather
the means for creating technology. In this way action mirrors artifice's
rejection of human thought and behavior.
Another area of overlap between action and artifice suggests a third category
of useful but unpatentably inactive works: works that operate in the same way
that they do in nature, not in a way created or at least influenced by human
intervention. 46 The difference between naturally occurring and "artificial"
action, so to speak, most often comes up when courts are trying to determine
whether a work created through human intervention might nonetheless still be
an unpatentable phenomena of nature. 47 How a claimed invention operates is
thus important under both the action and artifice requirements.
Much like artifice, patentable action falls along a spectrum, and claimed
inventions display varying degrees of action, depending on the elements
involved.48 Some elements of an invention are more patentably active than
others,49 such that the sum total is more or less "active" when the invention is
viewed as a whole. Thus, for example, all patentable inventions involve some
level of human activity and thought, if only in their creation, but the more
human activity the invention entails to carry out its purpose, the less it satisfies
either the artifice or action requirements.50 Similarly, the more an invention
4' Karjala, Distinguishing Patent, supra note 35, at 448-49; see also Kevin Emerson
Collins, Semiotics 101: Taking the Printed Matter Doctrine Seriously, 85 IND. L.J. 1379,
1433 (2010) (referring to patentable action as a "nonsemiotic" (non-information) property);
see also infra text accompanying notes 184-193 (discussing the printed-matter doctrine).
46 Cf Linda J. Demaine & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Reinventing the Double Helix: A
Novel and Nonobvious Reconceptualization of the Biotechnology Patent, 55 STAN. L. REV.
303, 338 (2002) (warning against "mistak[ing] utility for newness" in distinguishing
patentable subject matter from products of nature).
47 E.g., Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948).
48 See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S.Ct. 1289, 1298-1300
(2012); Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1065 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (quoting In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1402 n.22 (C.C.P.A. 1969)); Research Corp.
Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 868 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see also Lloyd L.
Weinreb, Copyright for Functional Expression, Ill HARV. L. REV. 1149, 1178 (1998).
49 I WILLIAM CALLYHAN ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS 343
(1890) (describing patentable inventions as combinations of elements "each performing its
own function by its own peculiar mode of operation").
5o See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3226 (2010) ("Concerns about attempts to
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entails and depends on patentable action to carry out its purpose, the more
patentable the invention is likely to be.
The concept of action thus differs from utility and in fact requires something
more than utility. To be sure, the function or action of an invention is an
important factor under the utility requirement for patentability.5 ' The utility
requirement is not a stringent one, however; as long as an invention has an
identifiably specific and substantial purpose and actually works for that
purpose, the invention satisfies the utility requirement. 52 Many inventive ideas
are thus patentably useful, but for some, "their utility is too far removed from
what is claimed" to be patentable subject matter.53 Only if an invention,
"considered as a whole, is performing a function which the patent laws were
designed to protect (e.g., transforming or reducing an article to a different state
or thing), then the claim satisfies the [subject matter] requirements of § 10 1.'"54
The following Part demonstrates how artifice and action both explain and
reconcile patentable subject matter doctrine and decisions.
The Proof Patentable Subject Matter as Artifice and Action
Artifice and action may sound intuitively appealing as general descriptions
of patentable subject matter, but do they explain patentable subject matter? Or
are they the result of other, more determinative factors? Neither the Patent Act
nor the courts cite artifice and action as the motivating impetus behind
patentable subject matter, instead citing the assumed economic rationales
driving patent law more generally.55 In reality, however, these oft-cited
pragmatic explanations for patentable subject matter have little or no
explanatory power.
The combination of artifice and action, by contrast, does not necessarily
reflect the most efficient way to draw patentable subject matter boundaries, but
it at least explains and reconciles much of what is otherwise a haphazard
jumble of doctrine that has long characterized the case law. Although
call any form of human activity a 'process' can be met by making sure the claim meets the
requirements of §101."); accord In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 972 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc)
(Dyk, J., concurring).
si 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 112 (2013); see also Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg.
1092 (Jan. 5, 2001).
52 Utility Examination Guidelines, supra note 51; Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro
Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Fuller v. Berger, 120 F. 274, 275 (7th
Cir. 1903).
5 In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007); accord Chiappetta, supra note 34,
at 106 n.71; Eisenberg, supra note 32 at 10.
54 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192 (1981); accord AT&T Corp. v. Excel Comm.
Mktg., Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1358-59).
5s Lab. Corp. v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126-27 (2006) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting); see Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67-68 (1972); see also generally Allen
K. Yu, Within Subject Matter Eligibility - A Disease and a Cure, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 387
(2011) (questioning whether current doctrine truly promotes progress).
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patentable subject matter restrictions must comb through an ever-changing
array of claimed inventions, artifice and action are the two constants that unify
this diverse area of law.
The judicial categories of excluded subject matter and the statutory
categories of included subject matter are perfect examples of how artifice and
action define patentable subject matter.
Phenomena of Nature
Phenomena (or "products") of nature are a perfect example of how artifice
and action distinguish patentable from unpatentable subject matter. Although
case law does not explicitly define this category of unpatentable subject matter,
phenomena of nature, as the name would suggest, are any naturally occurring
forces, mechanisms, or materials. Phenomena of nature exist without human
aid or intervention and thus by definition lack artifice.
In this way artifice reflects the distinction between "discoveries" and
"inventions," a distinction courts often use to explain why phenomena of
nature are unpatentable. Even if previously unknown or unappreciated and
therefore "new" in some sense, phenomena of nature are already existing
phenomena that can only be discovered, not invented. Inventions, on the other
hand, are truly new creations that, without human intervention, would not
exist. Only inventions - that is, the products of artifice, not nature - are
patentable; mere discoveries are not.56 As the Supreme Court explained in
Chakrabarty, the relevant distinction for purposes of SectionlOl is "between
products of nature ... and human-made inventions."57
Phenomena of nature are distinguishable from patentable technology for
more than just lack of artifice, however. Natural phenomena are neither
inactive nor inert, but without human intervention, phenomena of nature do not
act or function in any way that is "new" or acquire any new use. 58 Rather,
natural phenomena bacteria perform in their natural way to their natural effect
and thus merely "serve the ends nature originally provided and act quite
independently of any effort of the patentee."59 Natural phenomena thus fail the
action requirement because they lack the kind of humanly created functionality
characteristic of patentable technology.
What is even more important in distinguishing patentable technology from
phenomena of nature is the fact that both artifice and action are scalar qualities.
56 See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293
(2012); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3230 (2010); Parkerv. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 591-
92 (1978); see also Samoff, supra note 20, passim.
5 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 313 (1980).
5 Natural phenomena are active and function in a variety of naturally occurring ways,
such as metabolizing and producing, conducting electricity, absorbing moisture,
combusting, transmitting mechanical energy, oxidizing, and reducing.
5 Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948); accord
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310; Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 615 (1887).
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Technology must not only differ in form and function from naturally occurring
phenomena but must also display such "markedly different characteristics from
any found in nature" so as clearly to constitute "a product of human
ingenuity." 60
To understand the scalar nature of patentable artifice and action, compare
the Supreme Court's 1948 decision in Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo
Inoculant Co. with the Court's decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty. Although
based on ostensibly similar facts, these decisions came to very different
conclusions that can be explained only by acknowledging action as a
requirement for patentable subject matter.
In Funk Bros., the Supreme Court invalidated a patent on a mixture of root
nodule bacteria used to help leguminous crops fix nitrogen from the soil. 61
Prior to the invention, farmers had to buy separate species of bacteria because
no single species would work with all legume varieties, and if the farmers
mixed several species together, the bacteria would inhibit one another. Bond
discovered that certain strains of each species could be combined into a single
inoculant without inhibiting one another. By mixing these select strains into a
single inoculant, Bond's invention saved farmers from having to buy and work
with multiple inoculants and saved manufacturers from having to make and
stock multiple inoculants. Bond's inoculant clearly promoted the progress of
the agricultural arts.62
Although the Court agreed that Bond's work was "ingenious" and "an
important commercial advance," the Court rejected the claim as an
unpatentable phenomenon of nature. 63 It was Bond's research into the non-
inhibitory qualities of certain Rhizobium strains that was "ingenious," but this
was merely a "discovery" of naturally occurring characteristics, not an
invention. How Bond applied that discovery in creating a mixture of these
species, on the other hand, was "hardly more than an advance in the
packaging," according to the Court.64
Thirty years later, however, the Supreme Court found the bacteria in
Diamond v. Chakrabarty to be patentable subject matter, unlike the bacteria in
Funk Bros. Chakrabarty's claimed invention combined four naturally occurring
plasmid genes into a single Pseudomonas bacterium that could digest crude oil
spills. Prior to Chakrabarty's work, multiple bacterial species had to be used to
clean oil spills, but Chakrabarty's invention streamlined oil spill clean-up by
allowing the use of a single bacterial species.65Although Chakrabarty's
bacterium combined naturally occurring genes, the Court held that the
bacterium was not "nature's handiwork" but was in fact Chakrabarty's own
60 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309-10, 313; Hartranft, 121 U.S. at 615.
6' Funk Bros. Seed Co., 333 U.S. at 131.
62 Id. at 131-32.
63 Id.
6 Id.
65 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 305-10.
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"nonnaturally occurring manufacture or composition of matter" and therefore
patentable. 66
On its face, the invention in Chakrabarty appears directly analogous to the
invention in Funk Bros.: the discovery of naturally occurring bacterial
characteristics and their combination into a single, easy-to-use form. How the
Court nonetheless came to such different conclusions in such similar cases is
unclear. Many critics simply dismiss Funk Bros. as a poorly decided case that
was more about obviousness than it was about subject matter.67 If Bond's
bacteria were obvious, however, why did not the Court simply decide the case
on that ground, instead of deciding the case on patentable subject matter
grounds? And more importantly, given that that Court opted to decide Funk
Bros. on subject matter grounds, why were the results so different from the
Court's later decision in Chakrabarty?
The superficial similarity between Funk Bros. and Chakrabarty stems from
the fact that both inventions involved human recombination of naturally
occurring characteristics into novel compositions. Chakrabarty had combined
the naturally occurring petroleum-degradation qualities of multiple species into
a single bacterium, and Bond had combined the naturally occurring mutual
non-inhibition qualities of multiple bacterial strains into a single inoculant.68
Both inventions thus displayed artifice - human intervention to create
something that had not previously existed - and action - active function to
accomplish some purpose.
Because artifice and action are not binary qualities, however, a patent
applicant cannot simply point to any arguable characteristic of artifice and
action. A claimed invention instead must demonstrate artifice and action
sufficient to create markedly different characteristics from any found in nature.
While Bond was able to demonstrate some artifice and action, that
demonstration was not sufficient to convince the Court that the bacterial
mixture was patentable technology, not a natural phenomenon.
As a first matter, Bond's bacterial mixture failed to display adequate artifice.
Like most claimed inventions based on natural phenomena, Bond's inoculant
involved some human intervention, if only to collect the bacterial strains at
issue and combine them into a novel mixture. The Court saw this
recombination of select bacterial strains as an obvious advance in "packaging"
- the Court saw the degree and kind of human intervention needed to mix
whole bacteria as minimal. Bond's inoculant thus did not possess the kind of
artifice necessary for patentability. And although discovering which bacterial
66 Id. at 309-10. (Although the question of whether Chakrabarty's bacteria were products
of nature was not an issue presented to the Court, the Court clearly agreed that "[h]is claim
is not to a hitherto unknown natural phenomenon.").
67 Efthimios Parasidis, A Uniform Framework for Patent Eligibility, 85 TuL. L. REv. 323,
351 (2010).
68 Compare Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 305 n.1, with Funk Bros. Seed Co., 333 U.S. at
129-30.
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strains could be mixed without inhibiting one another required significant
effort on Bond's part, the discovery of this mutual non-inhibition did nothing
to change the bacteria themselves from their natural state. 69
Moreover, although the Funk Bros. majority never used the term "obvious"
in referring to Bond's bacterial mixture, both the Supreme Court and lower
courts have subsequently used the terms "obvious," "token" and "well-
understood, routine, conventional" frequently in their rejections of
unpatentable subject matter.70 These terms appear at first to be references to
non-obviousness or other patentability requirements in ways that serve only to
confuse the patentable subject matter inquiry. Courts' recurring focus on token
elements can better be understood, however, as references to quantities of
artifice and action such as the minimal level of artifice in Funk Bros., that are
insufficient for patentability.
One might question the actual difference in degree of artifice between Funk
Bros.' bacterial mixture and the genetically engineered bacterium that the
Court found patentable in Chakrabarty. Introducing genetic plasmids into the
bacterium in Chakrabarty only arguably required more human intervention and
thus only arguably more artifice than mixing the inoculant in Funk Bros.7 1
Bond's inoculant in Funk Bros. suffered from not only an insufficient degree
of artifice but also from a complete lack of humanly created action, as required
under both the artifice and action requirements.
Specifically, Bond's bacteria were biologically active in a variety of ways,
including nitrogen fixation, but none of these activities were humanly created
in a way that would confer patentability. As the Court noted in that case, the
individual bacteria in Bond's mixture continue to function in the same way and
to the same ends as they had always functioned, and thus were merely
"serv[ing] the ends nature originally provided." 72 Chakrabarty's bacterium, on
the other hand, was likewise biologically active in many naturally occurring
functions but also now possessed a different, "distinctive" use - that of
digesting petroleum. 73 Arguably, Chakrabarty's bacterium acted in ways that
merely fused naturally occurring bacterial activity, and yet this fusion
sufficiently altered the bacterium's overall functioning in a way that
demonstrated human-made function - that is, patentable action and artifice.
The so-called purification line of cases also demonstrates how gradations in
artifice and action distinguish patentable technology from unpatentable natural
69 Funk Bros. Seed Co., 333 U.S. at 131; see also infra text accompanying notes 107-30
(discussing laws of nature as unpatentable subject mater).
70 See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1298
(2012); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3230 (2010) (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450
U.S. 175, 191-92 (1981)); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978); Classen
Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1067 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
7' Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309-10.
72 FunkBros. Seed Co., 333 U.S. at 131.
73 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309-10.
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phenomena. Courts are understandably wary of attempts to patent a naturally
occurring substance based simply on purification or isolation of the substance
from its natural state. Natural substances modified to create new chemical
entities are patentable technology, but merely plucking a leaf from a tree is
not.74 In General Electric Co. v. DeForest Radio, for instance, the Third
Circuit rejected an attempt to patent purified tungsten, holding that it was
unpatentable subject matter.75 Attempts to patent purified uranium and
vanadium met similar fates, 76 as did attempts to patent purified pine needle
fibers,77 purified vitamin C,78 purified ultramarine,79 and purified alpha
alumina.80 In another series of decisions, however, courts upheld patents on
purified forms of vitamin Bl 2 and dolomite - both natural substances - holding
them to be patentable subject matter.8' What differentiated the former
purifications from the latter?
The purification line of cases, like most patentable subject matter case law,
varies a great deal in approach and evidences no one consistent policy or even
linear progression. This general lack of coherence stems at least in part from
the fact that many purification cases focus on novelty or non-obviousness
rather than on patentable subject matter 82 and do not directly address the
product of nature doctrine.83
That being said, a strong current underlying the purification line of cases is
artifice and action. Regardless of whether the courts correctly understood the
74 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. (Myriad 1), 689 F.3d 1303,
1332 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
7 Gen. Electric, Co. v. De Forest Radio, Co., 28 F.2d 641, 642-643 (3d Cir. 1928).
76 In re Marden, 47 F.2d 957 (C.C.P.A. 1931); In re Marden, 47 F.2d 958, 959 (C.C.P.A.
1931).
n Exparte Latimer, 1889 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 123, 125.
78 In re King, 107 F.2d 618, 620 (C.C.P.A. 1939).
9 In re Merz, 97 F.2d 599, 601 (C.C.P.A. 1938).
80 In re Ridgway, 76 F.2d 602, 603 (C.C.P.A. 1935).
81 Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156, 161 (4th Cir. 1958); J.E.
Baker v. Kennedy Refractories Co., 253 F. 739, 742 (3d Cir. 1918).
82 See, e.g., In re Bergstrom, 427 F.2d 1394, 1397 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (explicitly equating
"new" under § 101 with novelty under § 102); Merck & Co., 253 F.2d at 161 (looking only
at novelty and utility requirements); see also Conley & Makowski, supra note 20, at 319-20,
387; Burton T. Ong, Patenting the Biological Bounty of Nature: Re-Examining the Status of
Organic Inventions as Patentable Subject Matter, 8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 1, 23
(2004).
83 See, e.g., In re Kratz, 592 F.2d 1169, 1174 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (addressing composition
including 20% of naturally occurring strawberry flavor); In re Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031, 1032-
33 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (focusing primarily on patentability of living organisms); Parke-Davis
& Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 Fed. 95, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff'd, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir.
1912) (addressing patentability of adrenaline base not found in nature); Farbenfabriken of
Elberfeld Co. v. Kuehmsted, 171 F. 887, 890 (N.D. Ill. 1909) (addressing patentability of
aspirin, a non-naturally occurring compound).
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science behind each of these cases, the emphases are the same: did the claimed
substances at issue appear to be altered enough in both form - artifice - as well
as function - action - to be patentable subject matter? This Article obviously
cannot present an exhaustive review of all purification case law, nor does it
pretend to reconcile them all. Nonetheless, by comparing those cases in which
purifications were held to be unpatentable with those in which they were
patentable, one can readily trace the concepts of artifice and action.
Consider the cases in which purifications were held to be unpatentable
subject matter. In Ex parte Latimer, the PTO rejected an application for
somewhat purified pine needle fiber.84 The fibers were intended for use in
textile manufacturing, but the court noted that the fibers were not in any
manner affected or produced by the process of which they were a result or that
their natural condition as fibers "has in any wise been affected, changed or
altered."85 The fibers had undoubtedly been changed to some extent if only by
virtue of their isolation from the "silicious, resinous, and pulpy parts of the
pine needles," but this degree of artifice was obviously not sufficient for
patentability.86 The fibers were merely a "natural product," not a "new
material."87
Yet other unpatentable natural products failed not only artifice but also
action. In DeForest Radio, for example, the Third Circuit held that purified
tungsten was not an invention but rather a product of nature.88 The court
focused on the functionality of the purified tungsten, finding that, although
purified tungsten was eminently more ductile than and thus "immensely" more
useful than the natural crystalline form, tungsten's ductility was simply one of
its naturally occurring characteristics, not a "new characteristic" achieved
through purification.89 The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals ("CCPA")
stated the same with regard to the heightened ductility of the purified
vanadium and uranium.90 A number of other cases followed similar reasoning
to reject purified ultramarine91 purified vitamin C, 9 2 and purified alpha
alumina93 for failure to show new functionality over their naturally occurring
forms.
In other words, the purified forms of tungsten, vanadium, and uranium
failed to present any new utility or functionality and therefore all lacked
84 Exparte Latimer, 1889 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 123, 123-25 (1889).
85 Id. at 125.
86 Id. at 123.
87 Id. at 125; Conley & Makowski, supra note 20, at 321.
88 Gen. Electric, Co. v. DeForest Radio, 28 F.2d 641, 642-43 (3d Cir. 1928).
89 Id. at 643.
90 In re Marden, 47 F.2d 957, 957 (C.C.P.A. 1931); In re Marden, 47 F.2d 958, 959
(C.C.P.A. 1931).
9' In re Merz, 97 F.2d 599, 601 (C.C.P.A. 1938).
92 In re King, 107 F.2d 618, 620 (C.C.P.A. 1939).
9 In re Ridgway, 76 F.2d 602, 603 (C.C.P.A. 1935).
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patentable action - the pure and naturally occurring forms were distinguishable
only in the intensity of their naturally occurring characteristics. No matter how
useful a purification may be, it is unpatentable if it differs from its natural
occurring analog merely in degree and not in kind.94
In cases in which courts have found purifications to be patentable subject
matter, by contrast, the purifications display artifice and action in the form of
new functionality, not just intensification of naturally occurring characteristics.
For example, ten years prior to its DeForest Radio decision, the Third Circuit
in J.E. Baker v. Kennedy Refractories Co. held substantially purified dolomite,
a naturally occurring form of magnesian limestone used to line metallurgical
furnaces, to be patentable subject matter.95 As the court explained, although a
product of nature, the dolomite "is so transformed that new characteristics,
both physical and chemical, are given it" that the purification process created a
patentable manufacture. 96 Specifically, purification also gave the dolomite in
J.E. Baker new functionality, and patentable new action, in the form of a
moisture-resistant coating.97
The Second Circuit came to a similar conclusion in Union Carbide v.
American Carbide, in which the court found crystalline calcium carbide to be
patentable over its naturally occurring but impure amorphous form. 98 Like the
purified dolomite in JE. Baker, purification into crystalline form gave calcium
carbide a different solubility, density, hardness, and a melting point than the
natural, amorphous form, all of which the court saw as new chemical and
physical qualities compared to its natural counterpart.99
The difference between purified tungsten, vanadium, and uranium on the
one hand and purified dolomite and calcium carbide on the other is thus not
just the degree but also the type of transformation involved. In J.E. Baker and
Union Carbide, the purification process appeared to cause such significant
physical and chemical changes - patentable artifice - that each purification
acquired new, humanly appointed function - patentable action.
There are, of course, purification cases that, when looked at as a matter of
rigorous scientific fact, do not seem consistent with the artifice-plus-action
standard. For example, courts have differentiated purified prostaglandins, 00
9 In re Merz, 97 F.2d at 601.
SJ.E. Baker v. Kennedy Refractories Co., 253 F. 739, 739-42 (3d Cir. 1918).
96 Id. at 742 (The court did not explicitly refer to the invention as "purified dolomite" but
does clearly refer to the invention as the result of "freeing ... raw dolomite" from
"objectionable features," suggesting the removal of impurities.).
97 Id. at 741.
98 Union Carbide, Co. v. Am. Carbide, Co., 181 F. 104, 107 (2d Cir. 1910).
99 Id. (although all these qualities of crystalline calcium carbide can be seen as
characteristics, not "actions," they also are forms of action - i.e., "melting," "dissolving,"
"resisting impact" (hardness), and so on - that were material to calcium carbide's industrial
uses.)
loo In re Bergstrom, 427 F.2d 1394, 1397 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
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vitamin B12,101 tetracycline,102 and norepinephrine'l0 3 from their naturally
occurring forms based on the fact that purification removed impurities that had
previously made the natural form unusable, thereby effectively "transforming"
the substance by giving it "new" functionality.104 It is true that a product of
nature modified to create new functionality could qualify as patentable subject
matter. Scientifically speaking, however, simply removing inhibiting or
dangerous impurities does not necessarily create new functionality but rather
simply frees up existing functionality. 0 5
Nonetheless, the courts in these cases clearly perceived the purification of
prostaglandins, vitamin B12, and the other naturally occurring substances as
creating "new" functionality. The way the courts viewed the facts, purification
modified the natural substances into new ones, and the modification allowed
the substances to operate in a way that they could not have been made to
operate otherwise.106 The standard the courts applied in these cases thus
adheres to artifice and action as implicit requirements for patentable subject
matter.
Laws of Nature
Laws of nature are observable, naturally occurring principles or "scientific
truths." 07 Laws of nature include correlations and other precepts that define
the relationships between natural forces and materials, such as the law of
gravity or E = mc 2, a law of special relativity. 08 Courts sometimes analogize
mathematical algorithms to laws of nature, presumably because mathematical
101 Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156, 164 (4th Cir. 1958).
102 Chas. Pfizer & Co. v. Barry-Martin Pharmas., Inc., 241 F. Supp. 191, 194 (S.D. Fla.
1965).
103 Sterling Drug, Inc., v. Watson, 135 F. Supp. 173, 175-76 (D.D.C. 1955)
(norepinephrine claimed under the pharmaceutical name "arterenol"); see also Parke-Davis
& Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,
196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912) (suggesting this standard in dicta); Farbenfabriken of Elberfeld
Co. v. Kuehmsted, 171 F. 887, 890 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1909) (same); see generally Richard S.
Gruner, Intangible Inventions: Patentable Subject Matter for an Information Age, 35 Loy.
L.A. L. REV. 355, 399 (2002).
" In re Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031, 1032-33 (C.C.P.A. 1977); In re Bergstrom, 427 F.2d
1394, 1396 (C.C.P.A. 1970); Merck & Co., 253 F.2d at 164; Chas. Pfizer & Co., 241 F.
Supp. at 194; Sterling Drug, Inc., v. Watson, 135 F. Supp. 173, 175-76 (D.D.C. 1955).
105 Given that purified prostaglandins, vitamin B12, norepinephrine, bacteria, and
perhaps even tetracycline all function in vivo the same way as they do in their purified forms
- and the court's opinion in each of the respective cases certainly do not suggest otherwise -
In re Bergy, 563 F.2d at 1032-33; In re Bergstrom, 427 F.2d at 1396; Merck & Co, 253 F.2d
at 164; Chas. Pfizer & Co., 241 F. Supp. at 194; Sterling Drug, Inc., 135 F. at 175-76 -
purification seems merely to have freed up naturally occurring functionality.
106 In re Bergstrom, 427 F.2d at 1396.
107 See, e.g., Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp., 306 U.S. 86, 93-94 (1939).
18 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012).
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algorithms can be used to define either naturally occurring relationships
between numbers or numerical relationships between naturally occurring
phenomena and forces of nature.1 o9
Much like phenomena of nature, laws of nature are unpatentable subject
matter,'10 but as with phenomena of nature, how to distinguish laws of nature
from patentable technology is not clear at first glance. A closer look reveals
that laws of nature, like all other unpatentable subject matter, can be identified
by their lack of adequate artifice and action.
Like phenomena of nature, laws of nature lack adequate artifice by
definition - they are both the works of nature, not of human intervention.
Unlike phenomena of nature, however, laws of nature also lack adequate action
because they are merely descriptions of how natural phenomena behave."'
Laws of nature such as the laws of physics, chemistry, mathematics, and
biology (which are largely a composite of chemistry and physics) may have
great value in describing or explaining various phenomena, but those
descriptions are information, which is itself inert and does not itself "behave,"
"perform," or "operate" in any patentable way.' 2
Laws of nature are thus information only and do not themselves act or
behave in any way, natural or humanly appointed. As the Supreme Court has
often stated, "[i]f there is to be invention from such a discovery, it must come
from the application of the law of nature to a new and useful end,"" 3 not
merely for its descriptive content alone. Laws of nature or other informational
works otherwise fail to create sufficient artifice and action.
In the Supreme Court's recent decision in Mayo Collaborative Services. v.
Prometheus Laboratories., for example, the patent at issue involved a method
of improving thiopurine treatment of autoimmune disorders." 4 The method
entailed administering the thiopurine, measuring the patient's thiopurine
metabolite levels, and then adjusting subsequent thiopurine doses according to
that data." 5 Although the method was novel and immensely useful, the
Supreme Court rejected it as unpatentable subject matter.11 6 Specifically, the
method at issue was primarily a description of the correlation between a
109 See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 214-15 (1981); see also Mackay Radio &
Tel. Co., 306 U.S. at 94 (describing mathematical algorithms as "expressions of' scientific
truths). But see, e.g., Donald S. Chisum, The Patentability ofAlgorithms, 47 U. Prr. L. REv.
959, 980-84 (1986) (distinguishing algorithms from laws and phenomena of nature).
"o Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. at 1293.
11 Id. at 1297
112 Id. at 1293.
" Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (quoting in Funk Bros. Seed Co. v.
Kalo Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)); accord Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185-86.
114 Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. at 1296-97.
115 Id. at 1295.
"I Id at 1294.
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patient's metabolite levels and the effective dose of thiopurine. 17 And, as the
Court noted, "a patent that simply describes [a naturally occurring] relation
sets forth a natural law." 18
Not all works employing the informational value of laws of nature are
unpatentable, however. For example, contrast Prometheus with Diamond v.
Diehr, decided thirty years earlier. .119 The process at issue in Diehr applied a
well-known mathematical algorithm (the Arrhenius equation) in a known
method for curing rubber to identify when the rubber-curing process was
complete, based on temperature and cure time. 12 0 The process in Diehr thus
mirrored the process in Prometheus in that both used laws of nature to describe
how to adjust known processes. Unlike the result in Prometheus, however, the
result in Diehr was that the rubber-curing process at issue was patentable
technology, not just an unpatentable law of nature. 121 What distinguishes these
two cases?
Unlike the process in Prometheus, Diehr's process entailed more than just a
law of nature and the information it contains. Diehr's process added what the
Supreme Court saw as a significant number of additional elements that
effectively added both artifice and action to the otherwise unpatentable law of
nature. These steps involved manipulating and monitoring the rubber,
including perhaps most significantly the use of "physical and chemical
process[es] for molding precision synthetic rubber." 22 The addition of these
other, active and artificial elements was "sufficient to ensure that the patent in
practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the natural law
itself."1 23
The invention in Diehr was thus far more than just information about a
naturally occurring correlation. The Arrhenius equation as used in Diehr's
process was just a small part of a human-made process that actively operated in
a variety of mechanical, chemical, and physical ways to transform uncured
rubber. 124 Unlike the process in Prometheus, Diehr's process demonstrated
more than adequate artifice and action.
That is not to say that Prometheus' method was completely devoid of
117 Id.
" Id. at 1297.
11 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 184 (1981).
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. at 1294 (citations omitted).
124 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 184. In this regard, the Court gave an arguably liberal
interpretation to claims I and 2 of Diehr's patent application, as neither of those claims
directly state a "physical and chemical process" for curing rubber other than the operation of
a rubber molding press. See id. at 179 n.5. Nonetheless, the Court apparently viewed those
claims as describing the entire rubber molding process rather than just the calculation step of
the process.
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artifice or action. The drug dosage-adjustment method at issue did require the
extra steps of administering the drug, allowing the patient to metabolize the
drug, and then measuring its metabolites.1 25 Yet those additional steps did not
create sufficient artifice or action. The additional steps were merely those
necessary to gather the relevant date for the correlation and to identify the
relevant audience. None of these steps is enough to change the almost
exclusively informational content of the method and to qualify for
patentability.
Indeed, the Prometheus Court emphasized the scalar nature of patentable
subject matter, placing the method along a spectrum between the Court's
earlier decisions in Parker v. Flook and Diehr.126 On the patentably artificial
and active end of the spectrum is Diehr, with its significant physical and
chemical steps. The process for adjusting alarm limits in Flook, by contrast,
added no such active steps such as "chemical processes" or alarm triggering
means. 127 Thus, instead of claiming a process that performed some active
function, the patent in Flook claimed a process for calculating what was
"simply a number" - i.e., simply information.128 Because the Prometheus
method was primarily informational in nature - as the Court said, "[t]o put the
matter more succinctly, the claims inform a relevant audience about certain
laws of nature" 29 - the Court decided it fell on the unpatentable Flook end of
the spectrum.130
Abstract Ideas
Of the three main categories of excluded subject matter, abstract ideas are
probably the most difficult to define, in part because the category is so
expansive that it overlaps with other categories of subject matter, both
excluded and included. Nonetheless, as with all patentable subject matter, the
undertones of artifice and action are readily evident.
For example, unpatentable subject matter such as mental processes, human
activity, legal and economic theory, raw data, literary, musical, and other
expressive and descriptive materials all have been referred to as abstract
ideas.13' Laws of nature and mathematical algorithms have also been referred
to as abstract ideas.132 Indeed, if defined broadly enough, the term "abstract
125 Eisenberg, supra note 32, at 25-26.
126 Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. at 1298-1300.
127 Id. at 1299.
128 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 186-187.
129 Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. at 1298.
130 Id. at 1299-1300.
131 See, e.g., MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2106.01 (8th ed. rev. 2006);
see also Burk, supra note 34, at 141-42.
132 E.g., Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. at 1299-1300 (law of nature); Gottschalk v.
Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65, 68 (1972) (mathematical algorithm); In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d
1354, 1360 (Fed Cir. 1994) (mathematical constructs are "the paradigmatic 'abstract idea"').
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idea" could be used to characterize all patentable inventions, given that patents
protect not concrete or tangible embodiments of an invention but rather the
"abstract" inventive concept behind the invention.1 Courts, of course, do not
define the abstract idea category quite so broadly, but given the category's
wide and amorphous boundaries otherwise, distinguishing a patentable
inventive concept from an unpatentable abstract idea is difficult.
The Supreme Court's 2010 decision in Bilski v. Kappos is an example of
this ambiguity. Bilski involved a so-called business-method of hedging risk
against price changes in the energy commodities market. 134 The Court affirmed
the Federal Circuit's decision that the method was an unpatentable abstract
idea, but neither the Supreme Court nor the Federal Circuit seemed to be able
to agree amongst themselves as to why. As Justice Stevens noted in his
concurrence, the Court has "never.provide[d] a satisfying account of what
constitutes an unpatentable abstract idea."1 35
Given the overlap between abstract ideas, laws of nature, and even
phenomena of nature, it should come as no surprise that abstract ideas also boil
down to a lack of artifice and action. Phenomena, laws of nature, and
mathematical algorithms rejected as abstract ideas obviously lack artifice. And
even works displaying artifice, such as artistic works, philosophies, and even
economic or other social science data, may be considered unpatentable abstract
ideas for lack of action as merely informative or expressive. Data, instructions,
expressive and artistic works, and other such abstract ideas are by definition
"descriptive," 36 and although potentially useful and even technological in
nature,137 descriptive material does not actively perform, behave, or operate the
way technology does.
Courts have rejected many attempts to patent mathematical algorithms, data,
and other more descriptive materials, even when claimed as used on computers
or other devices. The overall utility of such works, whether performed in the
human mind or in the processors of a computer, is still nothing other than their
use as information or expression.138 Similarly, additional steps such as data
gathering or data storage in using an otherwise unpatentable law of nature are
" See, e.g., Bancorp Servs. v. Sun Life Assurance, 687 F.3d 1266, 1277 (Fed Cir.
2012); In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 1245-46 (C.C.P.A. 1978) abrogated by In re Bilski,
545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Chisum, supra note 109, at 974-75; see also Alan L.
Durham, The Paradox of "Abstract Ideas, " 2011 UTAH L. REv. 797, 843-44; Morris, supra
note 40, Res or Rules, at 498.
134 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3223 (2010).
135 Id. at 3236 (Stevens, J., concurring).
136 Interim Guidelines, supra note 11, Annex IV, at 50-57; MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 131, at § 2106.01. The latest version of the Manual,
however, places the distinction between functional and non-functional descriptive material
under utility rather than patentable subject matter. Id. at § 2111.05.
137 Karjala, Distinguishing Patent, supra note 35, at 448-49.
131 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 n.l1 1(1978); Eisenberg, supra note 32, at 22-23.
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dismissed as token limitations or strategic claim drafting.139 In fact, such data
gathering steps only emphasize the fact that the main purpose of the invention
at issue is information, not technology. 140 Use of information, ideas, or laws of
nature in inventions that act, function, or perform, on the other hand, satisfies
both artifice and action.141
Moreover, mathematical algorithms, laws of nature, information and other
descriptive materials are a form of intelligence and knowledge, not "useful
Arts;" "[iun other words, the patent statute does not allow patents on particular
systems that depend for their operation on human intelligence alone, a field of
endeavor that both the framers and Congress intended to be beyond the reach
of patentable subject matter."1 42
Indeed, the same lack of artifice and action bars all inventions based
primarily on human activity or thought. Patentable subject matter doctrine
gives no suggestion "that processes for organizing human activity were or ever
had been patentable."l 43Again, although all inventions require some degree of
human intervention, thought, and creativity, that human intervention and
creativity are the artifice necessary to create inventions, not inventions in
themselves.144 As the Supreme Court's decision in Bilski noted, "[c]oncerns
about attempts to call any form of human activity a 'process' can be met by
making sure the claim meets the requirements of [Section] 101"145 i.e.,
artifice and action.
Distinguishing abstract ideas from patentable technology is not always so
clear, however, given that both artifice and action lie along a spectrum. Chief
Judge Rader of the Federal Circuit adverted to this spectrum, stating that an
unpatentable abstract idea "should exhibit itself so manifestly as to override the
broad statutory categories of eligible subject matter."146
13 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012);
Bancorp Servs. v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 687 F.3d 1266, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also
Flook, 437 U.S. at 593 (warning that rigid reading of § 101 "would make the determination
of patentable subject matter depend simply on the draftsman's art").
140 See, e.g., Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. at 1298.
141 Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1067-68 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (using data to change the way vaccines affect patients is patentable process, not
abstract idea); see also MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 131, at §
2106.01.
142 In re Comiskey, 544 F.3d 967, 980 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (emphasis added).
143 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3234 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting with
approval In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 972 (2008) (Dyk, J., concurring)). Justice Stevens
appeared to have some doubt that the "abstract idea" category as currently defined provides
adequate protection against patents on human activity, however.
'" See, e.g., In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Archer, C.J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
145 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3226.
146 Research Corp. Techns., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 868 (2010); Classen
Immunotherapies, Inc., 659 F.3d at 1065; MySpace, Inc. v. Graphon Corp., 672 F.3d 1250,
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Although works based solely on human thought or behavior are clearly
unpatentable, there is no bright line rule as to exactly how much human
behavior or thought a patentable process may entail. On the one hand, the
business methods in Bilski v. Kappos and In re Comiskey involved almost
exclusively mathematical algorithms and human activity and were clearly
outside the realm of patentable subject matter. 147 On the other hand, for many
inventions some level of human involvement is not only inevitable but also
necessary. The PTO has granted a number of controversial patents on methods
involving human activity, including methods of typing and lifting boxes so as
to reduce the risk of injury, methods using sports equipment, and methods of
performing surgeries. 148 The patentability of these methods appears to stem
from the fact that they involve not only human activity but also action
effectuated through non-human devices, such as surgical instruments,
typewriters, and sports equipment.149 The overall artifice and action of these
latter methods are marginal at best, hence the controversy that surrounds them.
Machines, Manufactures, and Compositions of Matter
The discussion up to this point has focused on the categories of
unpatentable subject matter, but the plain meanings of Section 101's included
categories are also famously murky. The Supreme Court in Bilski suggests that
these four statutory categories are "independent" of one another,150 but the
plain meanings of each category would seem to overlap not only with each
other but also with unpatentable subject matter.15 1 The apparent overlap applies
only to the plain meanings of these categories, however, for the essential
characteristics of artifice and action readily distinguish how Section 101's four
categories of patentable subject matter are applied in practice.
1259 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
147 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3223-24; In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d at 970.
148 F. Scott Kieff et al., It's Your Turn, But It's My Move: Intellectual Property
Protection for Sports "Moves," 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 765, 773
(2009) (noting controversy over sports method patents); Carl A. Kukkonen, Be a Good
Sport and Refrain from Using My Patented Putt: Intellectual Property Protection for Sports
Related Movements, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 808, 821-24 (1998); Gerard N.
Magliocca, Patenting the Curve Ball: Business Methods and Industry Norms, 2009 BYU L.
REV. 875, 875-77.
149 See also infra Part.III.B. (discussing some of these patent types in more detail).
Iso Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225.
151 See, e.g., Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 728 (1880) ("The line between a
patentable 'process' and an unpatentable 'principle' is not always clear. Both are
'[conceptions] of the mind, seen only by [their] effects when being executed or
performed."'); John. F. Duffy, The Boundaries of Patent Law: Rules and Standards on the
Forefront of Patentability, 51 WM. & MARY L. REv. 609, 620 (2009) (noting "remarkable
breadth" of statutory categories of inclusion); Robert A. Kreiss, Patent Protection for
Computer Programs and Mathematical Algorithms: The Constitutional Limitations for
Patentable Subject Matter, 29 N.M.L. REV. 31, 33 (1999).
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Of the categories specifically listed under Section 101, perhaps the easiest to
understand in terms of artifice and action is machines. Intuitively, machines are
exactly what we might think of when we think of "technology."' 52
The Federal Circuit has defined a "machine" as "a concrete thing, consisting
of parts, or of certain devices and combination of devices[,]" a definition that
"includes every mechanical device or combination of mechanical powers and
devices to perform some function and produce a certain effect or result." 53
Machines therefore satisfy the requirement of action, for the "mechanical"
nature that defines machines means that machines perform work by leveraging
any of a range of physical, rather than human, forces.154 And although
machines are defined largely by their operation, machines also meet the
requirement of artifice as things that arise not in nature but through human
assembly.155
Manufactures and compositions of matter are not as intuitively
"technological" by their plain terms as machines are. According to the courts,
manufactures are works that are "man-made, in the sense of having been
encoded, generated, and transmitted by artificial means . . . giving to [raw]
materials new forms, qualities, properties, or combinations, whether by hand-
labor or by machinery." 56 Whereas machines are defined by their mechanical
and other powers - that is, by their qualities of action - manufactures are
defined by their artifice.
Compositions of matter are "all compositions of two or more substances and
all composite articles, whether they be the results of chemical union, or of
mechanical mixture, or whether they be gases, fluids, powders or solids." 57
One could conclude from this definition that compositions of matter do not
need to display artifice, but the courts have affirmed that a "manufacture or
composition of matter [is] a product of human ingenuity 'having a distinctive
name, character [and] use."" 5 8  Compositions of matter therefore possess
152 See DONALD CHISUM, 1-1 CHISUM ON PATENTS § 1.02(1) (2012) (and sources cited
therein).
15 In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
154 Mechanical Definition, DICTIONARY.COM,
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/mechanical?s=t (last visited November 29, 2013).
Although machines such as the telegraph, the telephone, and now computers have harnessed
electromagnetic as well as mechanical forces for well over a century now, courts continue to
define machines by their mechanical operations. See, e.g., In re Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359,
1364 (Fed. Cir. 2009). "Mechanical powers" thus presumably refers to all physical forces.
151 One sometime sees sports and other references to the human body as a "machine," but
for the most part, "machines" refer to non-natural entities.
56 In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d at 1356 (citations omitted); accord In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d
967, 977 n.10 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
1 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980); In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d at 1357;
In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d at 977 n. 10.
158 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309-10 (quoting Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 615
(1887)).
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properties that belong to none of their constituent ingredients in their separate
states.159
Whether any given item of manufacture or composition of matter displays
the requisite action, however, is less obvious. Manufactures and compositions
of matter may not always operate through mechanical devices or moving parts
but instead may operate through chemical, biological, electromagnetic, or other
physical forces. For example, pharmaceutical compositions of matter operate
through chemical and biological forces, as did Chakrabarty's genetically
engineered bacteria.160 Manufactures such as hand tools, golf balls, and toys
act through mechanical forces. Even new molecules and new chemical
elements operate through electromagnetic and sub-atomic forces.161
The definitions of machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter have
much in common, however, not only with each other and with processes, as
discussed below,162 but also with the categories of unpatentable subject matter.
Again, manufactures and compositions of matter are distinguishable from
phenomena of nature only by virtue of their artifice and action. Given that all
manufactures and compositions of matter derive from naturally occurring
materials, however, the dividing line between the patentable and unpatentable
is a question of degree. 163
Two contrasting cases involving chemical treatment of naturally occurring
raw materials provide examples on point.164 In each case, the respective courts
emphasized the implicit degree of both artifice and action that each claimed
invention exhibited. In American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Corp., the
Supreme Court held that oranges with rinds that had been impregnated with
borax to prevent mold were unpatentable products of nature. 165 Although better
able to withstand molding, the treated orange "remains a fresh orange fit only
for the same beneficial uses as theretofore" in the Court's eyes.166 As the Court
noted, "[t]he application of labor to an article, either by hand or by mechanism,
does not make the article necessarily a manufactured article . . . something
more is necessary... ."67
159 Robinson, supra note 49, at 278-79.
160 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 305 (describing the "energy-stabilizing" and "hydrocarbon
degradative" chemical and biological actions of bacteria at issue).
161 See Schering Corp. v. Gilbert, 153 F.2d 428 (2d Cir. 1946) (new molecule
patentable); In re Seaborg, 328 F.2d 996 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (new element patentable); In re
Breslow, 616 F.2d 516 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (new molecule patentable).
162 See infra text accompanying notes 211-216.
163 See Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156, 161-62 (4th Cir.
1958).
16 Am. Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1 (1931); Steinfur Patents Corp. v.
William Beyer, Inc., 62 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1932).
165 Am. Fruit Growers, 283 U.S. at 1-12.
166 Id. at 12.
167 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Fur skins impregnated with ferrous sulphate to protect them from the
damaging effects of and to accelerate later bleaching and dying, on the other
hand, were held to be patentable manufactures in Steinfur Patents Corp. v.
William Beyer, Inc.168 In Steinfur, the Second Circuit viewed the treated furs to
be different in both form and function, particularly in comparison to other
untreated furs that "cannot be used in the same way as one which has been so
impregnated." 69
The differences between Steinfur's treated furs and Am. Fruit Growers'
treated oranges seem minimal at first. In both cases, the inventors treated
naturally occurring products with chemicals in order to protect those products
from damage. Indeed, from this angle, the two inventions seem almost
identical. However, the differences in artifice and action between the two
claimed inventions are significant.
The oranges in Am. Fruit Growers failed to demonstrate either adequate
artifice or adequate action. Treating the rinds with borax neither altered the
rinds nor gave them new functionality.170 The borax did not chemically or
physically react with the rinds, and the rinds did not bind with or activate the
borax in any way.171 As the patentees explained their invention, the oranges'
rinds served merely to "carry" the borax, which was being used for its natural
antifungal properties.172 The Court also noted that the borax did not in any way
change the fruits' edibility or freshness, lest it interfere with the natural
function of the oranges as foodstuffs. 7 3 Thus, while treating the oranges with
borax to prevent mold might be patentable as a process, the process itself did
not create any "new or distinctive article" (artifice) "'having a distinctive
name, character or use'" (artifice and action).174
As the Second Circuit explained in Steinfur, by contrast, treating furs with
ferrous sulfate somehow changed both their leather and their hair so that their
strength, luster, and texture were not damaged by later bleaching and dying the
way they would have been without such treatment.175 In other words, the furs'
natural qualities were to react to bleaching and dying in deleterious ways, but
treating them with ferrous sulfate gave the furs the new qualities of resistance
to harm from bleaching and dying.176 Unlike Am. Fruit Growers' oranges, the
furs in Steinfur demonstrated both patentable artifice and action: "[b]y such
168 Steinfur, 62 F.2d at 238-40.
169 Id. at 240.
'70 Am. Fruit Growers, 283 U.S. at 11-12.
' Id.
172 Am. Fruit Growers, 283 U.S. at 6, 9.
17 Id.
174 Id. at 11-13 (quoting Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 613-615 (1887) (holding
that acid-cleaned and buffed sea shells to expose their natural qualities were not patentable
articles of manufacture)).
" Steinfur, 62 F.2d at 238-40.
176 Steinfur, 62 F.2d at 239-40.
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impregnation the skin attains a new quality which gives it a new beneficial use
... it fits it to be used for bleaching by a method which could not without such
impregnation be successfully employed."' 77
Another area in which patentable machines and manufactures overlap with
unpatentable subject matter, particularly after the advent of the computer age,
is with descriptive materials such as raw data or expressive works. Computers,
CDs, and other storage media are often used to store informational or
expressive material, but courts routinely hold that merely storing data on
computer-readable media does not transform otherwise unpatentable
descriptive material into a patentable manufacture or composition of matter.178
How do we resolve patentable subject matter issues when unpatentable
descriptive material is stored in otherwise patentable machines and
manufactures? Obviously, computers, electronic storage media, and just about
any other machine or manufacture on which descriptive material can be
processed or stored are clearly patentable subject matter as exactly that -
machines and manufactures.
Computer or storage media that are distinguishable from existing technology
only by the informational or expressive content stored on them, however, have
often been rejected under various incarnations of the "printed matter"
doctrine 79 The printed-matter doctrine states that a machine or manufacture
that differs from the prior art only by virtue of the information or expression
stored on it is "unpatentably obvious" over that prior art if that content has no
"functional" relationship with the device. 80
Although somewhat controversial in its own right,'8 ' and in any event
primarily a doctrine about non-obviousness under Section 103, the printed-
matter doctrine clearly has implications for patentable subject matter inquiries
under Section 101. Identifying whether a work is printed matter is in large part
a characterization of its subject matter, and the subsequent determination of
whether that printed matter serves a purely "non-functional" (i.e., descriptive)
role in an invention has profound implications for whether that subject matter
is patentable or unpatentable, particularly when it comes to computer
software.182 Indeed, the way in which the printed-matter doctrine has been used
in a number of patentable subject matter cases provides a further illustration of
the importance of artifice and action.183
177 Id. at 240.
178 MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 131, at § 2106.
179 See, e.g., CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 152, at § 1.02[4].
1so See In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1365-66 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Burk, supra note 34, at
141-45; Collins, supra note 45.
181 See infra text accompanying notes 249-267 on the printed-matter doctrine and point-
of-novelty approaches generally.
182 Burk, supra note 34, at 141-45.
183 See id.; see also MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 131, at §
2106.
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In the case In re McKee, the CCPA invoked the printed-matter doctrine to
reject an application to patent cuts of meat marked in a particular way for
identification. 84 The cuts of meat, as de minimis variations on natural
substances, were clearly unpatentable, and even claims for the method of
marking the meats were unpatentable.' 85 Marking did nothing to alter the
meats other than to store information on them.' 86 Similarly, the CCPA rejected
the method of using particular symbols to notate piano music at issue in In re
Rice. 87 In both cases, the printing at issue did not produce "a novel form" or a
"form [that] served a new and useful purpose;"188 in both cases, the printing at
issue did not produce either artifice or action.
In other cases, the printed-matter doctrine was not a bar to patentability. For
example, in In re Jones, the CCPA rejected a printed-matter challenge to the
patentability of an encoder disc distinguished only by the new pattern burned
into it. 18 Unlike the two unpatentable printed works in McKee and Rice, the
encoder disc in Jones was a new way of storing and conveying information in
a way independent of what information it stored or conveyed. The pattern on
the disc was not information itself but rather a way of physically altering light
rays directed through the disc to increase the accuracy of the information
thereby conveyed.190 The invention was thus not one of inert information but in
fact one of patentable action.191
Printed or descriptive matter may display adequate artifice as the product of
human creativity, but it fails action. At its most basic level, the printed-matter
doctrine embodies the idea that patentable inventions must operate in some
way and cannot simply exist as information or expression. The printed-matter
doctrine is thus just a variation on the unpatentability of abstract ideas,
algorithms, or mental steps.192 If an invention involves little more than
algorithms, mental steps, or abstract ideas, it is just information, and without
more, information always fails the artifice-plus-action standard.
Of course, unpatentable "printed matter" or other abstract ideas need not be
184 In re McKee, 64 F.2d 379, 379-80 (C.C.P.A. 1933).
85 Id.
186 Id.
187 In re Rice, 132 F.2d 140, 140-41 (C.C.P.A. 1942).
188 In re McKee, 64 F.2d at 380; accord In re Rice, 132 F.2d at 141 (quoting In re
McKee).
89 In re Jones, 373 F.2d 1007 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
190 Id. at 1013.
191 Id.; see also In re Gulack, 703 F.2d 1381, 1386-87 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (Educational band
imprinted with prime numbers is patentable subject matter because band functioned not only
to display digits but also to demonstrate their characteristics physically); Cincinnati Traction
Co. v. Pope, 210 F. 443, 446-47 (6th Cir. 1913) (finding patentable streetcar transfer ticket
books functioned even without printed matter).
92 CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 152, at § 1.02[4] (comparing printed matter
with mental steps); Burk, supra note 34, at 143.
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printed or in fact fixed in any sort of tangible medium.193 One of the most
interesting examples of this is In re Nuijten.194 Nuijten involved an attempt to
patent a "signal" used in a process to dampen distortions caused by
watermarking transmission of digital audio files and other expressive or
descriptive content.195
In determining whether the signals were patentable subject matter, the
majority began by construing the patent's claims.196 Although the majority
decided that the signals required a physical carrier, the court noted that any
physical carrier would do, leaving open the possibility that the signals were
significant not for their physical structure, but rather for the non-physical
descriptive material they encoded.197
Rather than focusing on the significance of the potential distinction between
the signal and its physical carrier, the majority instead interpreted the
distinction as meaning that the signals were non-corporeal and even
"transitory" in nature. 198 According to the majority, machines, manufactures,
or compositions of matter comprise only corporeal and tangible "parts,"
"articles," and "substances," thus not covering Nuijten's signals.199 Without
really explaining why, the court also stated that, while Nuijten's signals were
certainly the product of a process, the signals themselves were not a "process"
because they did not perform such actions or steps.2 00 Nuijten's signals were
therefore not patentable subject matter. 201 The majority's decision to focus on
the intangible and transitory nature of the signals quickly came under criticism,
not the least of which came from Judge Linn's dissent. To Judge Linn, an
intangible, transitory, but nonetheless physical invention could indeed be
considered an article of manufacture. 202 Further, a signal made from a physical
carrier like electromagnetic energy could easily qualify as "anything made for
use from raw or prepared materials." 203
The most telling parts of the decision were Judge Linn's dissenting
comments on whether the signals were merely "abstract ideas."204 Relying in
part on the printed-matter doctrine, Judge Linn argued that the signals were a
physical means for carrying information and data, not an attempt to claim
"I Burk, supra note 34, at 142-43; Collins, supra note 44, passim.
194 In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1 Id. at 1348.
196 Id. at 1352-54.
197 Id. at 1346-54.
198 Id. at 1353.
199 Id. at 1357.
200 Id. at 1354-57.
201 Id. at 1357.
202 Id. at 1358.
203 Id. at 1360.
204 Id. at 1363.
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information itself 20 5 This was a point that the majority's opinion did not even
mention - at least, not expressly. The majority did advert to the informational
content of the signals, but instead of focusing on this informational content, the
majority focused on the tangibility of the signals. The dissent, on the other
hand, seemed to discount the signal's informational content, arguing that
"[a]ny information that it conveys is distinct from the invention itself."206
While it is true that carrying information is a type of patentable action that
the signals possessed, the signals were also in part information. 207 The claim
on the signal described it as containing "supplemental data," referring to the
modifications to the watermark data, which were themselves modifications to
the original video or audio data.208 Thus, although Nuijten was not attempting
to claim the video or audio data that his signal carried, he was claiming
modified watermark data.209 Nuilten thus provides an example at the margin
between unpatentable information and patentable action.
Rather than recognizing the scalar nature of patentable action and
addressing whether Nuijten's signals displayed sufficient action, both the
majority and the dissent opted to take much more black-and-white, and
ultimately more confusing, approaches to the case. Applying an artifice-plus-
action standard might not have resolved the disagreement between the majority
and dissent opinions on the more technical issue of whether the signals were
information themselves or carriers of information. Looking at the case through
the lens of artifice and action certainly would have brought the dispute into
sharper focus and avoided what were ultimately distracting discussions about
whether transitory or ephemeral inventions qualify as articles of
manufacture.2 10
205 Id. at 1365.
206 Id. at 1365-68 (holding that the signals are not information alone since otherwise, a
storage medium for storing the signals, a claim the PTO has approved, would not be
patentable under the printed-matter doctrine).
207 The Nuijten signals thus differed from the "signals" in In re Walter, which the
C.C.P.A. found to have no physical carrier, and therefore to be merely abstract mathematical
data. In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, at 769-70 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
208 In re Nuiten, 500 F.3d at 1351.
209 Id. at 1365. In fact, the PTO rejected the claim on the signal as "merely data." Id. at
1353.
210 For example, the court conceivably could have compared the degree of patentable
action Nuijten's signal displayed with the physical cardiac electrical impulses transformed
into signals by the patented technology in Arrhythmia Res. Tech. v. Corazonix Corp., 958
F.2d 1053, 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The Nuijten majority did address Corazonix to a limited
extent. In re Nuiten, 500 F.3d at 1353. The court could have also compared Nuijten's signal
to the physical seismic wave signals in In re Taner, 681 F.2d 787, 790 (C.C.P.A. 1982). In
both Arrhythmia and Taner, the signals were naturally occurring phenomena, and so were
not evaluated as patentable subject matter themselves.
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Processes
Of all the categories of patentable subject matter, processes are perhaps the
most difficult to parse.211 Although processes often involve the use of
manufactures, machines, and compositions of matter, processes differ from the
other three categories of patentable subject matter because processes are states
of activity, not corporeal or structural entities. 212 Indeed, a process is in many
ways the purest form of action, for a process is an act or a series of acts or
steps.213
Whether any given process displays adequate patentable action, as well as
adequate artifice, is another issue. The difficulty with processes lies in the fact
that the definition of a process is broad and could encompass much that is not
patentable, including algorithms, abstract ideas, and human thought and
action. 214 Perhaps the most cogent example of how artifice and action
distinguish patentable processes from unpatentable processes, as well as how
difficult that distinction can be to draw, is the Federal Circuit's vacillations
over the proper linguistic test for identifying patentable processes.
For many years, the Federal Circuit applied the Freeman- Walter-Abele test,
particularly for computer software claims.215 The Freeman- Walter-Abele test
was a two-step test. First, the court had to determine whether the claim
involved a mathematical algorithm, formula, or mental step.216 If so, the court
would then look at whether the algorithm or mental step was applied to
specific physical elements or physical steps.2 17
Criticized for its potentially simplistic focus on particular claim elements, 218
the Freeman-Walter-Abele test was soon supplanted by the test the Federal
Circuit first put forth in In re Alappat: does the process yield a useful,
concrete, and tangible result?219 The useful, concrete, and tangible test required
2t See, e.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 592 (1978) (noting difficulty of discerning
patentable processes from unpatentable "principles").
212 Id. at 589 & 588 n.9; see also CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 152, at §
1.03.
213 In re Nuilten, 500 F.3d at 1355 ("The Supreme Court and this court have consistently
interpreted the statutory term 'process' to require action.").
214 See, e.g., Flook, 437 U. S. at 589 & 588 n.9; Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 728
(1880); Duffy, supra note 151, at 620; Kreiss, supra note 151, at 33.
215 In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 905 (C.C.P.A. 1982); In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 767
(C.C.P.A. 1980); In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 1245 (C.C.P.A 1978).
216 In re Abele, 684 F.2d at 905.
217 Id. at 907 (quoting In re Walter, 618 F.2d at 767); accord Arrhythmia Res. Tech. v.
Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1992); In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 838-39
(Fed. Cir. 1989).
218 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 958-59 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc); AT&T Corp. v. Excel
Comm. Mktg., Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Chiappetta, supra note 34, at 108
n.85; see also infra text accompanying notes 249-267 on the point-of-novelty approach.
219 AT&T Corp., 172 F.3d at 1358; Interim Guidelines, supra note 11, at 40, 45-46; Julie
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only that a claimed process employ specific steps to accomplish specific results
and rejected any requirement that algorithms be applied to or limited by
physical elements or steps.
The useful, concrete and tangible test was thus more expansive than
Freeman- Walter-Abele.220 For example, in its most famous application, this
test was used to approve the computer-operated financial services system at
issue in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group.221
Although the system did nothing more than crunch numbers, the Federal
Circuit stated that the system "transformed" data and was therefore useful and
specific enough to be patentable subject matter. 222 Similarly, in AT&T Corp. v.
Excel Communications, the Federal Circuit approved of a claimed process for
generating annotated long-distance telephone data, stating that because the data
in question was both useful and specific, the method passed under the useful,
concrete, and tangible test.223 Not surprisingly, the test quickly came under fire
for its expansive effect on patentable subject matter boundaries. 224
The Federal Circuit soon swung away from the liberality of the useful,
concrete, and tangible in In re Bilski by adopting the "machine-or-
transformation" test instead.225 Under this test, a process is patentable if it
either: (1) is tied to a particular machine or apparatus: or (2) transforms a
particular article into a different state or thing. 226 The machine-or-
transformation test, like the Freeman- Walter-Abele test before it, is thus less
expansive than the useful, concrete, and tangible test. 227 The Supreme Court
subsequently cautioned that the machine-or-transformation test cannot be the
sole test for patentable processes but also acknowledged that the test is
nonetheless a "useful and important clue." 228 Lower courts have continued to
use the machine-or-transformation test as their go-to yardstick for processes
under Section 101.229
E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry, 89
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 10 (2001).
220 AT&TCorp., 172 F.3d at 1358; In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
221 State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
222 Id. at 1373-75.
223 AT&T Corp., 172 F.3d at 1357-58.
224 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1004-05 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Mayer, J., dissenting).
225 Id. at 960.
226 Id. at 961-62.
227 See generally id. at 964-65; see also Katherine J. Strandburg, Much Ado Preemption,
50 Hous. L. REV. 563, 567 (2012); see also infra text accompanying notes 236-237.
228 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010).
229 See, e.g., Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 687 F.3d 1266, 1278
(Fed. Cir. 2012); PerkinElmer, Inc. v. Intema Ltd., 496 Fed. App'x 65, 72 (Fed. Cir. 2012);
CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1370-71 (Fed Cir. 2011); see
also Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1316 (2011) ("[T]he
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), patent litigants, and district courts have all
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The Federal Circuit's rejection of the "useful, concrete, and tangible test" in
favor of the machine-or-transformation test demonstrates a notable pattern. By
insisting that a patentable process be limited by a machine or by a
transformative or physical process step, the machine-or-transformation test
effectively returns to cabining patentable subject matter in a way very similar
to Freeman- Walter-Abele. Specifically, the Freeman- Walter-Abele and
machine-or-transformation tests resemble each other in ways that comport with
the requirements of artifice plus action.
For example, Freeman-Walter-Abele's physicality requirement is a strong
proxy for patentable action through physical forces and effects. A machine or
other apparatus operates through electrical or mechanical action, and any
chemical, biological, mechanical, or other physical process step would also
create patentable action. And while the Federal Circuit rejected the idea that
the machine-or-transformation test has any such physicality requirement, using
a physical means such as a machine or apparatus or producing some physical
transformation is an easy way to satisfy the machine-or-transformation test, as
suggested by the Supreme Court's earlier decisions on which the Federal
Circuit based the machine-or-transformation test,23 0 including several
Freeman- Walter-Abele decisions.231 In Diehr, for example, the Supreme Court
stated that "[tlransformation and reduction of an article 'to a different state or
thing' is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that does not include
particular machines." 232 Physicality can also help satisfy the artifice
requirement, as machines and other apparatuses are human-made, and
transformation of physical articles is artificial as well.
Consistent with this emphasis on patentable action, both the machine-or-
transformation and Freeman- Walter-Abele tests disallow data and information
processing inventions.233 "[I]f the end-product of a claimed invention is a pure
number, as in Benson and Flook, the invention is non-statutory regardless of
continued to rely on the machine-or-transformation test in the wake of Bilski: no longer as
the sole rule, but as a presumptive starting point that threatens to become effectively
mandatory.").
230 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 961 (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972));
In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 978-79 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
231 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 962-63;,see In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d at 979-80 (citing also
In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 1994)); In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835,
838-40 (Fed. Cir. 1989); In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 908-09 (C.C.P.A. 1982); In re Meyer,
688 F.2d 789, 795-96 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (explaining the physical aspects of the machine-or-
transformation test).
232 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 184 (1981) (quoting Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S.
780, 787-788 (1877)); see also Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3244-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(questioning whether patent law was originally devised to address only tangible and
physical inventions).
233 See, e.g., In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 965 (rejecting "transformation" of one number to
another as inadequate under the machine-or-transformation test); DealerTrack, Inc. v.
Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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any post-solution activity which makes it available for use by a person or
machine for other purposes." 234 Likewise, human thought or human activity,
without more, has been held to fail both tests.235
The useful, concrete, and tangible test, by contrast, focused almost
exclusively on specificity and utility and excluded only abstract ideas that were
too vague while including those that that, under the Freeman- Walter-Abele or
machine-or-transformation tests, would have been too inert or inactive. With
almost no regard for patentable action or artifice, the useful, concrete, and
tangible test allowed patenting of what other courts have before and since
excluded as mental processes, mathematical algorithms, and human behavior.
For example, under the useful, concrete, and tangible test, "the mere fact
that a claimed invention involves inputting numbers, calculating numbers,
outputting numbers, and storing numbers, in and of itself, would not render it
non-statutory subject matter," as long as those numbers represented something
specific and useful. 236 Equally controversial was the inclusion of methods
involving primarily human behavior or mental processes as patentable under
this test. As Judge Mayer noted in his Bilski dissent, the useful, concrete, and
tangible test gave rise to patents covering financial methods, methods of
dating, and even methods for getting patents, many of which "rang[ed] from
the somewhat ridiculous to the truly absurd." 237 The useful, concrete, and
tangible test thus deviated from long-held resistance to patenting numbers,
algorithms, and human behavior and thought. In particular, the useful,
concrete, and tangible test lacked any implicit requirement that inventions
display patentable action.
Despite the machine-or-transformation test's continuing usefulness, the
Supreme Court has expressed concern that the test "would create uncertainty"
about information-age technologies. 238 The Court's reservations about the
machine-or-transformation test connote the sense that, while useful, the
machine-or-transformation test does not completely capture what distinguishes
234 In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 767-68 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
235 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 961 n.26, 964 (discussing that human thought is unpatentable
and human activity is not "physical activity" or transformative); in re Comiskey, 554 F.3d at
980 (same); In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 293-94 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (asserting that human
activity of bidding not "physical" under Freeman- Walter-Abele).
236 State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1374 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (quoting In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (1994)).
237 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1004 (Mayer, J., dissenting); Summary of the Manager's
Amendment, 157 CONG. REC. S1367 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (stating that in enacting the
America Invents Act, Congress created a special transitional program to allow post-grant
review challenges to eliminate "the backwash of invalid business method patents" granted in
the wake of State Street Bank); see also infra text accompanying notes 290-316 (discussing
business method patents).
238 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010) (discussing the uncertainty concerns
about computer software, medical diagnostic techniques, data compression, and the
manipulation of digital signals).
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patentable subject matter. Some inventions that are neither tied to machines or
apparatuses nor transformative in effect may nonetheless display adequate
action and artifice. Other inventions that do involve either machines or
transformation, on the other hand, may not be sufficiently active or artificial.
The In re Bilski court noted this difficulty in addressing machine-operated
processes in the Supreme Court's earlier decision Gottschalk v. Benson, one of
the cases from which the Federal Circuit drew the machine-or-transformation
test.23 9 In addressing a computer program that performed a specific
mathematical calculation, the Court held that, although the program operated
on a machine (a digital computer), the program was unpatentable because it
had no utility - that is, performed no patentable action - other than providing
information in the form of the solution to a mathematical algorithm. 240 The
machine-or-transformation test, like its Freeman- Walter-Abele predecessor,
may fail to discount insignificant ties to machines or token pre- or post-
solution activities such as data gathering.
The difficulty of deciding when machine or transformation limitations are
merely tokens of strategic claiming stems from the fact that, unlike the more
binary framework of either the machine-or-transformation or Freeman- Walter-
Abele test, patentable action and artifice are a matter of degree. The scalar
nature of action and artifice requires that the machine-or-transformation,
Freeman- Walter-Abele, and other such tests apply what is effectively an
additional token limitations doctrine to weed out insignificant limitations that
might otherwise have satisfied these patentability tests.
For example, one line of cases rebuffs attempts to patent unpatentable
processes through token limitations to existing machines or manufactures. 241
This line of cases holds that claiming a general-purpose computer in the
performance of simple "number crunching" is "an attempt to exalt form over
substance since the claim is really to the method or series of functions
itself."242 Where a machine "function[s] solely as an obvious mechanism for
permitting a solution to be achieved more quickly, i.e., through the utilization
of a computer for performing calculations," the machine limitation is not
meaningful.243
Another line of cases under the so-called new-machine doctrine states the
exact opposite proposition. In In re Alappat, for example, the court stated that
"a general purpose computer in effect becomes a special purpose computer
239 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 954 (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972)).
240 See Benson, 409 U.S. at 71-72.
241 See CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1374-75 (Fed. Cir.
2011); In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 840-41 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (Tying unpatentable process to
programmed computer does not make it patentable.); In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 909
(C.C.P.A.1982); In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 795 n.3 (C.C.P.A. 1982); In re Gelnovatch, 595
F.2d 32, 37 (C.C.P.A.1979).
242 In re Abele, 684 F.2d at 909.
243 SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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once it is programmed to perform particular functions" and hence an
independently patentable machine.2 44 Under the approach of this line of cases,
programming a computer with new software physically "changes" it so that it
has new "electrical paths" and new memory elements. 245
On the surface these two lines of case law appear to adopt diametrically
opposing views on the patentability of processes performed on computers or
other such machines. On the one hand, if a computer is patentable as a machine
when originally invented, how can it become unpatentable simply because of
the addition of an unpatentable process? 246 A "new" computer performing that
process may be neither novel nor non-obvious, but it would presumably still
qualify as a "machine" within the meaning of SectionlOl. But on the other
hand, why allow an effective end-run around the unpatentability of abstract
ideas by condoning strategic claiming and the addition of machines as token
limitations?
Nonetheless, both lines of cases can be seen as consistent with artifice and
action. Although appearing rather liberal, the new-machine doctrine cases
generally involve the use of computers for more than just calculating or
computing data. The vast majority involve not just data computation or storage
but also patentable action, in a variety of forms: generating pulse; mechanical
drafting; spatially locating and displaying items; rotating and stopping a slot
machine reel; conversion of electrical and magnetic seismic traces into cross-
sectional maps; conversion of cardiac electrical impulses into digital signals;
and new physical combinations of and interactions between computer circuitry
components. 247 The patentable action in many of these cases is marginal, to be
244 In re Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1545; accord In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1403 n.29
(C.C.P.A. 1969).
245 WMS Gaming Inc. v. Int'l Game Techn., 184 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 1999); In re
Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395, 1400 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
246 See Chiappetta, supra note 34, at 131.
247 See, e.g., WMS Gaming, 184 F.3d at 1346-47; In re Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1541-42 &
n.17 (noting addition of barrel shifter and logic circuit components distinguished claimed
rasterizer from prior art rasterizers); Arrhythmia Res. Tech. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d
1053, 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (under Freeman-Walter-Abele, apparatus construed to convert
"analog" electrical impulses generated by the heart into digital signals); In re Iwahashi, 888
F.2d 1370, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (improved autocorrelation apparatus defined by "specific
structural limitations"); In re Sherwood, 613 F.2d 809, 819 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (under
Freeman-Walter-Abele, apparatus construed as including means for "sonogramming,"
"dividing," and "plotting"); In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 1240 (1978) (computation means
combined with computer display means and mechanisms for specifying shape and position
of symbol images); In re Noll, 545 F.2d 141, 148 (C.C.P.A.1976) (claimed machine
included machine general purpose computer, pulse generators, master clock, and display
device); In re Bemhart, 417 F.2d at 1399 (allowed apparatus claim construed as including
"mechanical drafting machines" as well as computing machines, but disallowed apparatus
claims construed as including only general purpose computer). An exhaustive survey of
cases applying the new-machine doctrine is of course beyond the scope of this Article.
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sure, but the machines did at least perform some action other than simply
processing or storing data and other information. In the line of cases rejecting
processes tied to general-purpose computers or other machines, by contrast,
those devices served only to process or store data, not to perform any
patentable action. The courts therefore dismissed these devices as insignificant
to the patentability analysis. 248
Simply dismissing computer or other machine limitations in process claims
raises its own issues. This kind of focus only on certain individual limitations,
rather than on the invention as a whole, falls under what is often called a point-
of-novelty approach. 249 This approach focuses on what a court perceives to be
the "heart" or gist of an invention, effectively ignoring or at least discounting
any other constituent elements. 25 0 To view printed matter, a law of nature,
algorithm, or abstract idea as the main distinguishing element of an invention
and then reject the invention as unpatentable on that basis is an example of a
point-of-novelty approach.25 1 Similarly, discounting data gathering steps, the
use of a general-purpose computer, or any other limitation as token,
conventional, or obvious and therefore insignificant to the heart of gist of an
invention is also a point-of-novelty type of approach. 252
The problem with point-of-novelty approaches is that they contravene the
general rule that an invention must be evaluated as an interconnected whole,
with no one limitation given more or less weight than any other.253 Many
patentable inventions, such as the rubber-curing method at issue in Diamond v.
Diehr, use laws of nature, algorithms, and other unpatentable subject matter to
create new and non-obvious combinations of or improvements upon existing
248 See, e.g., Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 687 F.3d 1266, 1276-77
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (dismissing use of computers and computer readable media for "repetitive
calculations" of life insurance policy values); Fort Props, Inc- v- Am- Master Lease LLC,
671 F.3d 1317, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (dismissing use of computer to manage real property
information); CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1373-77 (Fed
Cir. 2011) (dismissing computer-readable medium format of credit card fraud analysis
claim); In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 841 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (dismissing use of computer to
analyze clinical test data); In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 909-10 (C.C.P.A.1982) (allowing
claim to "computed tomography apparatus" but disallowing claim to apparatus that merely
calculated and displayed data values); In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 795-96 (C.C.P.A.1982)
(rejecting claim on apparatus programmed to analyze system diagnostic data).
249 Bernard Chao, Moderating Mayo, 107 Nw. U. L. REV. 423, 423, 425 (2012); Tun-Jen
Chiang, The Rules and Standards of Patentable Subject Matter, 2010 Wisc. L. REV. 1353,
1412-13.
250 Chao, supra note 249, at 425.
251 In re Gulack, 703 F.2d 1381, 1385 & n.8 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see generally Chao, supra
note 249; Kevin Emerson Collins, Prometheus Laboratories, Mental Steps, and Printed
Matter, 50 Hous. L. REv. 391 (2012).
252 Chao, supra note 249, at 439-40; Chiang, supra note 249, at 1412-13.
253 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188-89 (1981); In re Gulack, 703 F.2d at 1385 &
n.8; In re Taner, 681 F.2d 787, 791 (C.C.P.A. 1982); see also Chao, supra note 249, at 433.
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technology. A point-of-novelty approach might nonetheless have disallowed
Diehr's method because its point of novelty was the use of the Arrhenius
equation, an unpatentable algorithm. 254 Indeed, given that all inventions
involve algorithms, laws and phenomena of nature, or abstract ideas to some
extent,255 focusing on such elements as the heart or gist of an invention could
lead to all inventions being declared unpatentable. 256 Furthermore, whether or
not any particular element of an invention is "conventional," "token," or
otherwise insignificant to the heart or gist of invention is perhaps better
addressed under the novelty and non-obviousness requirements, not under
patentable subject matter.257
The point-of-novelty approach nevertheless continues to crop up in
patentable subject matter cases, most notably in the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Prometheus.258 Even Diehr seemed to condone a point-of-novelty
type of approach in some circumstances, re-emphasizing that insignificant
post-solution activity "will not transform an unpatentable principle into a
patentable process." 25 9 How can courts evaluate inventions as a whole while at
the same time discounting some limitations as insignificant and unimportant?
This tension between the point-of-novelty and invention-as-a-whole
approaches stems from the fact that artifice and action are not only scalar
qualities but also ones whose sufficiency is measured in terms relative to the
invention as a whole. While any single element of an invention may clearly
possess or lack artifice, the proportion of natural versus human-made and inert
versus active elements as well as their respective roles affects whether the
invention as a whole displays adequate artifice and action.260 For example,
even though the computer or other device on which information or expression
is stored always possesses the same absolute levels of artifice and action (and
might otherwise qualify as a machine or a manufacture by itself), in relative
terms that device will be considered unpatentable subject matter if it adds little
by way of patentable action or artifice to the invention as a whole.
The Federal Circuit's recent decision in Bancorps Services v. Sun Life
254 In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 766 (C.C.P.A. 1980); see also Chiappetta, supra note 34,
at 103-04 (noting that on much the same bases, many other patentable inventions would
have been unpatentable under the point-of-novelty approach); Mark A. Lemley, Point of
Novelty, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. 1253, 1278 (2011).
255 See, e.g., In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 1244 (C.C.P.A. 1978); see also Chiang,
supra note 249, at 1412-13 (discussing this objection in other contexts).
256 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 189 & n.12.
257 Id. at 189; in re Freeman, 573 F.2d at 1244.
258 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1297 (2012).
259 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191-92 (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978)); see also
Chao, supra note 249, at 429-430.
260 In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 291 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (noting that some activities are
"insufficient to impart patentability"); accord Fort Props., Inc. v. Am. Master Lease LLC,
671 F.3d 1317, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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Assurance Co. nicely illustrates the relativity of artifice and action.261
Bancorps addressed method, system, and medium claims for calculating and
managing stable value life insurance policy values.262 The patentee argued that
the computer system and medium claims automatically fell within Section 101
because they covered tangible machines and manufactures. 263The court
rejected this argument, noting that the form of a claim alone does not
determine its patentability; a claim's form is effectively just one element of an
invention. 264 The gist of Bancorps' overall invention, what the court referred to
as "the underlying invention," was the calculation and management of policy
values.265 Furthermore, the claimed invention used a computer and computer-
readable media only to store information. 266 Computers and computer-readable
media assisted only in "the performance of repetitive calculations," and were
in fact so immaterial to the method as to be unnecessary.267 As such, any
patentable artifice and action that these devices might have contributed were
thus clearly insignificant to the claimed invention as a whole.
THE ARTIFICE-PLUS-ACTION STANDARD APPLIED
As the discussion above has shown, the single common thread implicit
throughout patentable subject matter case law is the combination of artifice and
action. Although in many ways just another linguistic test, using artifice and
action to define patentable subject matter could provide some advantages,
particularly in its recognition that it is not bright lines that distinguish
patentable from unpatentable subject matter but rather subtle shades of
difference. The following Part explains some of the advantages and then
briefly describes how artifice and action might be applied to resolve some of
the more difficult questions that patentable subject matter doctrine currently
faces, such as the patentability of business methods, genetic materials, and
computer software.
The Advantages of the Artifice-Plus-Action Standard
Before noting the advantages of using artifice plus action to identify
patentable subject matter, this Part acknowledges some of the problems that
artifice plus action do not solve.
The most obvious problem, of course, is that the combination of artifice and
action explains patentable subject matter cases - except when it does not. At
261 Bancorps Servs. v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 687 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
262 Id.
263 Id. at 1273.
264 Id. at 1277 (citing, inter alia, Flook, 437 U.S. at 593).
265 Id. at 1276-77.
266 Id.
267 Id. at 1276-78; see also, e.g., CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d
1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (applying identical analysis to disallow computer and medium
claims).
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least a fraction of the case law on patentable subject matter has and likely will
continue to deviate from, or at best constitute weak examples of, the general
pattern of artifice and action. Nonetheless, artifice and action are clearly
significant and persistent themes throughout patentable subject matter law and
should not be overlooked.
Another problem with artifice and action is that they are not necessarily the
most efficient or "correct" way to define patentable subject matter in terms of
what will best promote the "Progress of useful Arts." Other, more
economically driven ways of defining patentable subject matter may be more
effective in terms of distinguishing inventions that would benefit from patent
incentives from those that would unduly hinder future innovation.
On the other hand, there is good reason to doubt whether any definition of
patentable subject matter - or any other patent law doctrine - can truly
optimize the balance between providing incentives without unduly hindering
future development. The optimal way to incentivize any given type of
technological development is far from clear.268 And how to apply patentability
criteria in a way that most effectively promotes technological progress is
perhaps impossible to know without prescience; the best that courts can do is
to rely on their intuitions about what patentable technology ought to
be. 269Accordingly, the artifice-plus-action standard stands wholly apart from
any economic rationales for why inventions should and should not be patented
and advert only to what we do know about how courts actually decide
patentable subject matter distinctions. An artifice-plus-action standard for
patentable subject matter may not achieve optimal incentives for further
innovation, but it is at least a more transparent and direct explanation of what
courts have been doing all along.
Although the artifice-plus-action approach may seem like just another effort
to "read into the patent laws limitations and conditions which the legislature
has not expressed," 270 some sort of linguistic definition of patentable subject
matter is inevitable. The terms "useful Arts" and "technology" are not self-
explanatory, and Section 101's categories cannot be interpreted according to
their plain and ordinary meanings.271 Courts often rely instead on historical
understandings of these terms, and artifice plus action simply defines in
explicit terms what these historical understandings are. Expressly adopting an
268 Eisenberg, supra note 32, at 49.
269 Duffy, supra note 151, at 619-20. Many have nonetheless written extensively about
what patentable subject matter doctrine should be, and this Article does not in any way
attempt to critique those efforts. See, e.g., Andrew Chin, Gene Probes as Unpatentable
Printed Matter, 20 FED. CIR. B. 527 (2011); Richard S. Gruner, Better Living Through
Software: Promoting Information Processing Advances Through Patent Incentives, 74 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 977 (2000); Lemley et al., supra note 229; Olson, supra note 4; Samuelson,
Benson Revisited, supra note 4.
270 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3226 (2010) (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S.
175, 182 (1981)).
271 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588 (1978).
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artifice-plus-action approach to patentable subject matter could therefore foster
not only clarity but also predictability and even uniformity in legal treatment of
the wide array of technologies that patent law must address.
That being said, a third problem with artifice and action is that they are not
bright line rules but rather continuous characteristics that lie along a spectrum.
The degree of artifice and action necessary for patentability therefore requires
a judgment call that will vary from judge to judge and court to court. Thus,
even though applying artifice and action more explicitly will bring some
certainty to patentable subject matter, exactly how much artifice and action
will or will not suffice in any given case is still difficult to predict. The non-
economic and non-empirical nature of the assessment further exacerbates the
problem. The requisite degree of artifice and action has also varied over time
as the liberality of patentable subject matter has varied over time, creating yet
further uncertainty.272
Patent law frequently must address these kinds of line-drawing exercises.
The non-obviousness, utility, enablement, and even written description
requirements all lie along a spectrum, forcing courts to make judgment calls
about patentability. 273 Patent courts therefore presumably know how to deal
with the scalar nature of artifice and action and in fact have long acknowledged
that patentable subject matter lies along a spectrum. 274
Of course, in deciding issues of non-obviousness, utility, enablement, and
written description, courts can resort to the "PHOSITA" standard, or what a
"Person Having Ordinary Skill In The Art" of the invention might consider
obvious, useful, or enabled.275 Patentable subject matter doctrine, by contrast,
does not depend on the PHOSITA standard in judging how much artifice and
action is sufficient in any given case.276 Rather, the gold standards for artifice
and action are previously declared patentable and unpatentable subject matter,
272 See Eisenberg, supra note 32, passim; Duffy, supra note 151, at 614; Morris, supra
note 40, Res or Rules, at 505-08.
273 See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of
Patentability, 120 YALE L.J. 1590, 1608 (2011); Charles W. Adams, Allocating Patent
Rights Between Earlier and Later Invention, 54 ST. Louis L.J. 55, 106 (2009); Dan L. Burk
& Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, passim (2003);
Eisenberg, supra note 32, at 14.
274 E.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1298-1300
(2012); In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 906-07 (C.C.P.A.1982) (noting spectrum between clearly
statutory and clearly non-statutory subject matter); In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 765
(C.C.P.A. 1980) (relying on patentable subject matter "reference points" set in Flook); see
also Christopher A. Brown, Developments in Intellectual Property Law, 41 IND. L. REV.
1139, 1148 (2008) (noting patentable subject matter as an "inventive spectrum"); Eisenberg,
supra note 32, at 14 (". . . Supreme Court precedents on patent law, including its decisions
about patentable subject matter, more typically state broad, open-ended principles.").
275 Burk & Lemley, supra note 273, at 1648-51.
276 See generally Magliocca, supra note 148 (proposing a PHOSITA-like patentable
subject matter standard for processes).
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or what courts have referred to as "what is now clearly statutory .. . and what
is clearly non-statutory." 277
All the same, by embracing the scalar nature of both artifice and action,
patent law can avoid many of the problems associated with the subject matter
inquiry. As explained previously, recognizing that patentable action and
artifice are continuous variables allows patentable subject matter doctrine to
evaluate an invention as a whole, without having to discount any of its
constituent parts. For example, when an invention displays only a token degree
of artifice or action, in the form of a computer limitation or data-gathering step,
a court currently might have to discount those parts of the invention under a
point-of-novelty type of analysis. Under an artifice-plus-action approach, by
contrast, the court could acknowledge that the invention as a whole possesses a
minimal degree of artifice or action but still reject it as non-statutory subject
matter.278
Similarly, an artifice-plus-action approach would allow courts to avoid
many of the pitfalls to which bright-line rules are often subject. For instance,
recognizing that artifice and action are scalar quantities moves patentable
subject matter doctrine away from strategic claim drafting.2 79 Artifice and
action look beyond claim format, "magic words," 280 or other verbal attempts to
disguise non-statutory subject matter as a process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter. An artifice-plus-action approach focuses not just on the
words used to describe a claimed invention but also whether the invention as a
whole possesses adequate artifice and action.
This broadening of focus thus obviates the need for the new-machine
doctrine, the machine-or-transformation test, the printed-matter doctrine, and
other tests that focus more narrowly on category rather than characteristic.
Indeed, by focusing on the characteristics of artifice and action rather than on
statutory and non-statutory categories, patent law can move away from
extensional definitions - definitions of patentable subject matter by example -
and toward more intensional definitions - definitions of patentable subject
matter by its essential characteristics, artifice and action.28 1
Finally, an approach based on artifice and action allows patentable subject
matter to move away from the rigidity of bright-line rules toward the flexibility
277 In re Abele, 684 F.2d at 906-07 (noting spectrum between clearly statutory and
clearly non-statutory subject matter); accord Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. at 1298-1300; In
re Walter, 618 F.2d at 765; see also Brown, supra note 274, at 1148.
278 But see Kevin Emerson Collins, Bilski and the Ambiguity of "An Unpatentable
Abstract Idea, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 37, 63 (2011) (suggesting that the claim-as-a-
whole approach may not be optimal for certain types of abstract ideas).
279 See supra text accompanying notes 135-138.
280 Cohen & Lemley, supra note 219, at 9 (referring to strategic claiming of software as
machines or apparatuses as the "doctrine of magic words").
281 Cf Jeremy A. Lefstin, The Formal Structure of Patent Law and the Limits of
Enablement, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1141, 1205-06 (2008) (explaining extensional and
intensional definitions).
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of standards. Bright-line rules provide greater predictability, but patent law by
design covers an ever-evolving and unpredictable array of new and inventive
technologies. These new technologies present new challenges to definitions of
patentable subject matter, and bright-line rules do not adapt well to such
challenges. 282 In such unpredictable circumstances, rigid adherence to bright-
line rules can produce absurd results, as rules will tend to be both over- and
underinclusive.283 Courts therefore often must graft exceptions onto a rule or
otherwise try to change it in order to adapt to unforeseen situations, thereby
making the rule more complex, less predictable, and more prone to inconsistent
results.284 This is exactly what happened with the machine-or-transformation
test: the courts have had the make exceptions for computer-operated processes
that, although technically tied to machines, perform no patentable action. 285 In
such situations, standards can actually provide greater certainty than rules. 286
Standards provide less predictability up front but greater flexibility to address
uncertain conditions. 287 Given the constantly changing nature of patentable
technology, the Supreme Court has often voiced a preference for standards
over bright-line rules across a range of patent issues, including patentable
subject matter.288 In the case of the machine-or-transformation test, for
example, the Supreme Court rejected the test as a bright-line rule, opting
instead for a more flexible approach.289
Application to Business Methods, Sports Methods, Diagnostic Methods,
Genetics, and Computer Software
To explain how an analysis based on artifice and action might help simplify
and clarify patentable subject matter determinations, this Part discusses how
artifice and action might resolve the debate over the patentability of business
methods, sports methods, diagnostic methods, genetics, and computer
software. These categories of invention have been some of the most troubling
in terms of whether they qualify as patentable subject matter.
282 Chiang, supra note 249, passim; Duffy, supra note 151, at 610-11; Morris, Res or
Rules, supra note 40, passim.
283 Chiang, supra note 249, at 1354; Duffy, supra note 151, at 626, 631.
284 See, e.g., Duffy, supra note 151, at 633 (describing exceptions developed for "use of a
machine" doctrine); see also generally Chiang, supra note 249, at 1399-1400.
285 See supra text accompanying notes 239-245; see also Duffy, supra note 151, at 647-
48 (noting progressive exceptions to machine-or-transformation test as applied to computer-
operated processes).
286 Duffy, supra note 151, at 610 n. 1; Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law,
40 STAN. L. REv. 577, 609 (1988).
287 Chiang, supra note 249, at 1355; Duffy, supra note 151, at 611; Morris, supra note
40, Res or Rules, at 517-19.
288 Eisenberg, supra note 32, at 14 (providing examples in obviousness, the doctrine of
equivalents, the on-sale bar, and so on).
289 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010).
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As such, others have analyzed each of these categories in much greater
detail and nuance than is possible here. The following discussion is intended to
serve only as very brief illustrations of how the artifice-plus-action standard
might be applied. More importantly, whether any of these illustrations yields
the optimal outcome in terms of what best promotes technological progress is a
separate issue about which the following analysis remains agnostic.
Business Methods
The patentability of so-called business methods has become a controversial
issue in the last few decades.2 90 Previously, most business methods were
believed to be categorically unpatentable subject matter. 29 1 The advent of
computers led the financial sector and other business areas to make greater use
of information-age technologies, however, and the line between business and
technology useful in conducting business began to blur.292 The Federal
Circuit's 1998 decision in State Street Bank took an expansive view on the
patentability of business methods under the useful, concrete, and tangible test,
and for a time, business method patenting flourished.293
Public outcry soon followed, however, and the patent system began to rein
in business method patenting.294 In 1999, Congress enacted Section273,
establishing prior user rights as a defense to actions for infringement of
"method[s] of doing or conducting business." 295 The Federal Circuit rejected
the useful, concrete, and tangible test in favor of the machine-or-
transformation test in a series of decisions that took a much more strict
approach to the patentability of business methods. 296 Most recently, the
America Invents Act implemented a transitional program to allow post-grant
290 See generally John F. Duffy, Why Business Method Patents?, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1247
(2011).
291 See, e.g., State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368,
1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also Duffy, supra note 290, at 1256-57.
292 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3229; State Street Bank, 149 F.3d at 1376 n.13; see also Duffy,
supra note 290, passim.
293 Duffy, supra note 290, at 1250 (discussing effect of State Street Bank); John R.
Allison & Emerson H. Tiller, The Business Method Patent Myth, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
987, 99 1; Leo J. Raskind, The State Street Bank Decision: The Bad Business of Unlimted
[sic] Patent Protection for Methods of Doing Business, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA
& ENT. L.J. 61, 61 (1999).
294 Duffy, supra note 290, at 1250; Allison & Tiller, supra note 293, at Part II.
295 First Inventor Defense Act of 1999, 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2000).
296 CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Bancorp Servs.
v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 687 F.3d 1266, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2012); DealerTrack, Inc. v.
Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Fort Props., Inc. v. Am. Master Lease LLC,
671 F.3d 1317, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Cybersource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d
1366, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 959-60 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc);
see also In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 979-80 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (adopting machine-or-
transformation without explicitly rejecting useful, concrete, and tangible).
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review of patents on methods or apparatuses for "data processing or other
operations used in the practice, administration, or management of a financial
product or service," on the suspicion that many of the business method patents
issued after State Street Bank are invalid.297
The general discomfort with patenting business methods is clear, although
the reasons for it are not. Some critics doubt the validity of business methods
patents because of obviousness or anticipation, while others argue that business
methods should be unpatentable subject matter generally because business
innovations neither need nor benefit from the incentives of the patent
system.298 The Supreme Court in Bilski v. Kappos declined to hold business
methods categorically unpatentable subject matter and yet expressed its own
doubts about the patentability of most business methods. 299
The Court's equivocation on business methods makes sense under the
artifice-plus-action standard. In many cases rejecting business methods as
unpatentable - including the Supreme Court's decision in Bilski - the methods
were dismissed as abstract ideas. These business methods were considered to
be simply mathematical algorithms, mental processes or other types of
"concepts." 300 The true problem with these methods is not that they were
merely naked algorithms, mental steps, or other concepts or "fundamental
principles"; each method also employed multiple concrete steps involving
297 157 CONG. REC. S 1367 (Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (describing
transitional program as "reduc[ing] the burden on the courts dealing with the backwash of
invalid business method patents"); Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, P.L. 112-29, § 18, 35
U.S.C. §§ 321-329 (2013); AIA Frequently Asked Questions: Transitional Program for
Covered Business Method Patents,
http://www.uspto.gov/aia implementation/faqscovered business_method.jsp (last
modified Dec. 11, 2013; see also Patent Quality Improvement Act of 2013, S. 866, It3th
Cong. § 2 (2) (proposing expansion of transitional program beyond "financial product or
service" business methods).
298 E.g., Allison & Tiller, supra note 293, at 992-93; Alan Devlin & Neel Sukhatme, Self-
Realizing Inventions and the Utilitarian Foundation of Patent Law, 51 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 897,passim (2009); Eisenberg, supra note 32, at 26-27, 52.
299 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3228-29 (2010) (discussing 35 U.S.C. § 273 but
noting that business methods patents "raise special problems" and could "put a chill on
creative endeavor and dynamic change").
300 E.g., Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231 (2010) (merely concept of "hedging" against risk);
Alice Corp., 717 F.3d at 1275, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (merely concept of "employing neutral
intermediaries"); Bancorp Servs., 687 F.3d at 1280 (merely "concept of managing a stable
value protected life insurance policy"); DealerTrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1333
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (merely "clearinghouse concept"); Fort Props., 671 F.3d at 1322 (merely
"conceptual steps" toward tax-free exchanges of real estate); CyberSource Corp., 654 F.3d
at 1370-71; In re Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359, 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (merely "abstract
constructs" for marketing method); In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 294 (Fed. Cir. 1994); In re
Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 796 (C.C.P.A.1982); In re Maucorps, 609 F.2d 481, 486
(C.C.P.A.1979).
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specific types of data for specific practical ends. 30 1 The problem with these
disallowed business methods is that what limitations they added to the
algorithms, mental steps, or other concepts were not of the "inventive" sort302
that is to say, those additional limitations did not add sufficient artifice and
action to be patentable technology. The common factor in the disallowed
business methods is that they comprise only information and instructions for
human behavior, neither of which is a form of patentable action.
In Bilski, for example, the method at issue consisted primarily of
"identifying" (informing) and "initiating transactions" (human activity). 303
Other courts rejected business methods primarily for the informational steps of
"calculating;" "determining;" "incorporating language;" "identifying" and
"indexing;" "obtaining," and "forwarding" credit report data; "obtaining
information" and "constructing a map" of that information.; and "creating,"
"obtaining," and "adjusting" a shadow credit record.304 And although many of
the business methods involved the use of computers, the computers were used
for data processing - i.e., informational purposes - only.305 To the extent these
disallowed methods required any actions, those actions were all human
activity, such as "requiring a complainant to submit a request" and "conducting
arbitration resolution;" "offering" and "receiving bids;" "developing a shared
marketing force" and "obtaining an exclusive right to market;" "aggregating
property" and "encumbering the property;" and "instructing" exchange
institutions. 306 Although courts have been wary of declaring outright that
human activity per se is unpatentable subject matter, business methods and
other processes that depend primarily on human mental processes or other
human activity raise subject matter problems beyond whether the processes
constitute abstract ideas.307 Rejection of processes such as business methods as
3'0 See, e.g., Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3235, & 3238 n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also
Eisenberg, supra note 32, at 12-13.
302 See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294
(2012) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978)); Alice Corp., 717 F.3d at 1291.
303 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3223-24.
304 Alice Corp.,717 F.3d at 1287; Bancorp Servs., 687 F.3d at 1279-80; DealerTrack,
Inc., 674 F.3d at 1333-34; CyberSource Corp., 654 F.3d at 1370; In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d
967, 981 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Schrader, 22 F.3d at 293-94; In re Maucorps, 609 F.2d at
486.
305 See, e.g., Alice Corp., 717 F.3d at 1287; Bancorp Servs., 687 F.3d at 1276-77;
DealerTrack, Inc., 674 F.3d at 1333-34; CyberSource Corp, Inc., 654 F.3d at 1374-75; Fort
Props. Inc., 671 F.3d at 1323-24; In re Maucorps, 609 F.2d at 486 & n3.
306 Alice Corp., 717 F.3d at 1286; Fort Props. Inc., 671 F.3d at 1323-24; In re Ferguson,
558 F.3d at 1366; In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d at 981; In re Schrader, 22 F.3d at 293-94.
307 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3238 n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting excluded categories of
subject matter is all "that is left to stand between all conceivable human activity and patent
monopolies"); accord In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 972 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Dyk, J.,
concurring). But see Interim Guidance for Determining Subject Matter Eligibility for
Process Claims in View of Bilski v. Kappos, 75 Fed. Reg. 43922, 43926 (July 27, 2010)
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merely instructions for human activity is thus a prime example of how the
artifice-plus-action standard defines "technological invention[s]" that "solve[]
a technical problem using a technical solution." 308
One permutation on the business-method debate is presented by a case in
which the Supreme Court will hear oral arguments as this Article is going to
press. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International involves a claimed invention that
is in many ways almost identical to the one at issue in the Supreme Court's
earlier decision in Bilski v. Kappos. Both cases involve: business methods for
hedging risk during business transactions; intermediary institutions in hedging
against that risk; and most importantly, exchanges of information about the
transactions and parties to those transactions. 309 In both cases, an en banc
Federal Circuit rejected the claimed inventions as unpatentable subject
matter.310 These results comport perfectly with the artifice-plus-action
standard, since both cases involve what is primarily just human activity and
information about that activity, with little or no patentable action or artifice.311
The only real difference between Bilski and Alice Corp. is the fact that the
latter tied its business methods to computers and computer-readable media in
so-called "system" and "Beauregard" medium claims.312 The question
presented to the Court in Alice Corp. thus specifically addresses the effect of
incorporating computer technology on the patentability of Alice Corp.'s
claims.313
It is always risky to prognosticate when it comes to pending Supreme Court
cases, but if history is any indication, the Supreme Court may likely reject
Alice Corp.'s claims despite their computer ties. As Judge Lourie noted in his
concurrence in the Federal Circuit's en banc opinion, the computer-related
limitations add nothing and are merely incidental to Alice Corp.'s claimed
business method, which was itself just the "'disembodied' concept" of
reducing risk through the use of an intermediary. 314 Computerizing this
otherwise unpatentable method served only for calculation, storage, and
(describing "human behavior" and "instructing on 'how a business should be conducted' as
unpatentable "general concepts").
308 See, e.g., AIA Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 297 (distinguishing "covered
business methods" from "technological inventions" not covered by the transition program).
309 Compare Alice Corp., 717 F.3d at 1274, with Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3223-24, and In re
Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 950-51 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
310 Alice Corp., 717 F.3d at 1273 (deciding per curiam); In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 950-51;
see also Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3229-30 (affirming Federal Circuit decision).
311 See also supra text accompanying notes 303-308.
312 Alice Corp., 717 F.3d at 1287-88. "System" claims are essentially methods combined
with the tangible devices used to perform them. Id. at 1289. "Beauregard" claims recite the
use of computer-readable media to store computer software. Id. at 1287-88; see also infra
text accompanying notes 381-383 (discussing Beauregard claiming).
313 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Alice Corp.
v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 734 (2013) (No. 13-298).
314 Alice Corp., 717 F.3d at 1287, 1288.
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communication of information - in other words, the system and medium
claims fail to provide any "inventive concept" in the form of patentable
action.315 Despite its limitation to computer implementation, Alice Corp.'s
business method is not "inventive" and does not add sufficient artifice and
action to be patentable technology.3 16
Sports Methods
Unlike business methods, sports methods have not been the subject of
litigation or other challenges to their validity.3 17 Sports methods have,
however, been the subject of scholarly attention, most of which has been
critical.3 18
Sports methods often represent new ways of using known athletic
equipment, such as novel ways of swinging golf putters, exercising with wrist
straps, and playing football. 319 Sports methods are therefore presumably as
patentable as any other method of use. Nonetheless, critics object to sports
method patents because ideally, success in sports depends on human skill
rather than technology.320 The importance of the human elements in sports and
the inevitable variation in human skill may lead to problems of enablement or
claim definiteness, and the competitive nature of sports would seem to call for
a level playing field, not patent exclusivity.321
Enablement, claim definiteness, and other patentability requirements aside,
the importance of the human element in sports leads to the concern that sports
methods are not "technological" enough to be patentable. 322 Thus, like
business methods, sports methods may often involve equipment or other
apparatuses, but unless those apparatuses contribute significant artifice and
"I Id. at 1290-91.
316 Id. at 1291; see also Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289,
1294 (2012) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978)).
3 Neeraj Arora, Disabling Patentability for Skill-Based Inventions: Aligning Patent
Law with Competition Policy, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. REV. 1, 37-38
(2005).
11 See e.g., Derek Bambaurer, Legal Responses to the Challenges of Sports Patents, 18
HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 401(2005); Proloy K. Das, Note, Offensive Protection: The Potential
Application of intellectual Property Law to Scripted Sports Plays, 75 IND. L.J. 1073, 1080 &
nn.42-43 (2000); Giuliana R. Garcia, 11 U. DENv. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 81 (2011); Mark
Walsh, Patently Ridiculous?, N.J. L.J., Aug. 26, 1996, at A5.
319 U.S. Patent No. 6,712,720 (filed Mar. 11, 2002) (issued Mar. 20, 2004); U.S. Patent
No. 5,616,089 (filed Mar. 29, 1996) (issued Apr. 1, 1997); U.S. Patent No. 4,323,232 (filed
Sep. 26, 1977) (issued Apr. 6, 1982); U.S. Patent No. 4,911,443 (filed Dec. 28, 1988)
(issued Mar. 27, 1990); Arora, supra note 317, at 38.
320 Arora, supra note 317, at 38; Kukkonen, supra note 148, at 823.
321 Arora, supra note 317; Bambaurer, supra note 318, at 423-24; Garcia, supra note
318; Kukkonen, supra note 148, at 823.
322 Lemley et al., supra note 229, at 1346.
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action to the invention, those methods are non-statutory subject matter.323 The
more a particular sports method depends on human performance, the less
artifice and action it displays and the less patentable it is. Again, human skill is
a means to invention but not invention itself.324
Diagnostic Methods
A third type of process that involves significant informational content
coupled with significant human involvement is diagnostic methods. Usually
involving medical diagnoses, this category of methods correlates an observable
data pattern with a diagnosis of what typically causes the pattern. Not
surprisingly, courts have rejected diagnostic methods as laws of nature and
mental processes. 325 The fundamentally informational character of these
diagnostic methods is undeniable. As explained above, laws of nature and
mental processes are both forms of information, and correlations based on laws
of nature are informational as well. Indeed, diagnoses themselves are forms of
information, as are the data on which diagnoses are based. Any "data
gathering" steps incidental to these methods fail to overcome the informational
nature of diagnostic methods.326
That is not to say that methods or apparatuses for measuring or collecting
diagnostic data are all unpatentable subject matter, particularly if those
methods or apparatuses perform some patentable action in obtaining such
diagnostic data. For example, in Arrhythmia Research Technology, Inc. v.
Corazonix Corp., the court found a method and apparatus for measuring
cardiac electrical impulses to be patentable subject matter because both
converted naturally occurring cardiac electrical impulses into machine-
analyzable electrocardiograph signals in order to measure the impulses. 327
Claims to diagnostic methods that do not include steps involving meaningful
degrees of patentable action, by contrast, are not patentable subject matter.328
323 Cf SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(requiring machine limitation to "play a significant part in permitting the claimed method to
be performed" to confer patent eligibility).
324 Interim Guidance, supra note 307 (describing "human behavior such as exercising,
wearing clothing, following rules or instructions" as "general concepts").
325 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012); Lab.
Corp. v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126-27 (2006); Myriad 1, 689 F.3d 1303,
1334 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 796 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
326 Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. at 1297-98; Myriad 1, 689 F.3d at 1335; In re Meyer,
688 F.2d at 795-96.
327 Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonic Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1059 (Fed. Cir.
1992); see also In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 908-09 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (allowing claims to
computed tomography method that involved scanning); In re Meyer, 688 F.2d at 796 (noting
method contained only mathematical algorithm and no additional physical elements or
process steps).
328 Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. at 1298; Myriad 1, 689 F.3d at 1334.
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Genetics
Another challenging category of innovation is genetics, the subject of the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Association for Molecular Pathology v.
Myriad Genetics, Inc.329
Genes code for the synthesis of proteins, which in turn serve as structural
materials and catalysts for a variety of cellular processes. Genetics research has
become an increasingly important area of research and development due to its
centrality in biological processes. 330 Because genes are the primary units of
heredity, they provide information on disease risks, biological relatedness
between individuals, populations, and species, and even evolutionary
patterns. 331 The value of genetic material thus lies in not only its informational
content but also in the fact that this information is a catalog of naturally
occurring phenomena. 332
Genes do more than just inform; they are highly complex chemicals that
interact with a range of intracellular components. 333 Researchers have isolated
and manipulated genetic materials to take advantage of their chemical and
structural properties as binding sites for antibodies, to use them as probes,
primers, and markers for measuring genetic expression, and for chromosome
mapping, artificially synthesizing genes, and controlling protein expression.334
Genetic materials thus raise difficult issues under the artifice-plus-action
standard. On the one hand, genetic materials are derived from nature and
indeed are valued because of their naturally occurring informational content.
From this perspective, genetic materials would seem to fail both artifice and
action. On the other hand, genetic materials must be isolated from their natural
state in order to be sequenced or used in ways that are chemically and
mechanically useful. 335
329 Myriad II, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
330 See, e.g., Myriad 1, 689 F.3d at 1310; In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1554-56 (Fed. Cir.
1995); Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., Ltd., 927 F.2d 1200, 1207-08 (Fed. Cir. 1991); In
re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 895-99 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Eileen M. Kane, Splitting the Gene:
DNA Patents and the Genetic Code, 71 TENN. L. REv. 707, 708 (2004).
"' Myriad 1, 689 F.3d at 1310; Andrew Bowman, Genes 101: Are Human Genes
Patentable Subject Matter?, 18 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 15, 30 (2012); John J. Doll, The
Patenting ofDNA, 280 SCIENCE 689, 690 (1998).
332 See, e.g., Myriad II, 133 S.Ct. at 2112; Chin, supra note 269, passim; Collins,
Semiotics 101, supra note 45, at 1389; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Re-Examining the Role of
Patents in Appropriating the Value of DNA Sequences, 49 EMORY L.J. 783, 786-87 (2000);
Arti K. Rai, Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology: Addressing New Technology, 34
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 827, 836 (1999).
333 Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1206 ("A gene is a chemical compound, albeit a complex one.");
Eisenberg, Re-Examining the Role of Patents, supra note 332, at 784-86.
33 See, e.g., Myriad 1, 689 F.3d at 1310; In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1368 (Fed. Cir.
2005). Note that not all of these activities meet the utility requirement, but they do all
demonstrate patentable action. Id. at 1370-78.
133 See, e.g., Myriad 1, 689 F.3d at 1328-33.
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For the most part, both the PTO and the courts appear to have taken the
latter view - that isolated genetic materials are patentable subject matter.336
This view is seemingly not based on any case law directly addressing the
question. Rather, the patent system seems to have assumed that DNA is
patentable based on case law addressing issues other than patentable subject
matter.337 Whether isolation modifies naturally occurring DNA enough - that
is, whether isolated DNA possesses adequate artifice and action - therefore
remains a question to be answered.
Because of the informational content of genetic materials, moreover, their
patentability is more than just a question of isolation and comparison to other
examples of purified materials. Genetic materials come in a wide range of
forms, including genomic deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA, or what most people
think of as genes), messenger ribonucleic acid (mRNA), transfer RNA,
ribosomal RNA, mitochondrial DNA, and even artificial nucleic acid analogs,
such as peptide nucleic acids. 338 Deciding whether any particular type of
genetic material possesses adequate artifice and action therefore can require
extremely fine line-drawing.
For the sake of brevity, this discussion will focus on just a few genetic
material forms. Myriad involved three types of claims: isolated full-length
genes, isolated fifteen-nucleotide gene fragments ("oligonucleotides"), and
isolated complementary DNA ("cDNA").339 The Myriad Court held the cDNA
form to be statutory subject matter but rejected both the isolated genes and
oligonucleotides as unpatentable. 340
The Court's discussion of cDNA was surprisingly brief, suggesting that the
Court found this genetic form to be relatively non-controversial. 34 1
Complimentary DNA is formed in the laboratory by creating DNA-versions of
naturally occurring mRNA produced during the gene transcription.
Transcription is the process in which a gene is used as a stencil to produce
mRNA copies. 342
Messenger RNA differs from genomic DNA in one important aspect. Most
genomic DNA contains large percentages of "nonsense" sequences, or introns,
336 Eisenberg, Re-Examining the Role of Patents, supra note 332, at 785-86; Conley &
Makowski, supra note 20, at Pt.1V.A.
3 Intervet, Inc. v. Merial Ltd., 617 F.3d 1282, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Dyk, J.,
concurring in part); Stephen W. Chen et al., Patent Protection in Medicine and
Biotechnology: An Overview, 4 J. HEALTH & LIFE ScI. L. 106, 128 (2011).
338 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282 (filed Jun. 7, 1995) (issued May 5, 1998)
(describing dependent claims including "isolated DNA . . . which contains BRCAl
regulatory sequences").
3" Myriad I, 689 F.3d at 1340 (Moore, J., concurring in part).
340 Myriad II, 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2117, 2119 (2013).
341 See id. at 2119; see also Kane, supra note 330, at 741 (noting cDNA usually held to
be statutory subject matter).
342 Myriad 1, 689 F.3d at 1310-14.
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that are never expressed in protein synthesis. 343 During mRNA processing in
the cell, these introns are excised, leaving the mRNA with only the expressed
sequences, or exons.344 Thus, while mRNAs are molecules naturally produced
during the transcription process, cDNA copies of that mRNA - i.e., DNA
versions of genes containing exons only - do not occur in nature, a point that
the Myriad Court seemed to find dispositive. 345
What the Court's brief discussion of cDNA did not address, however, is
whether cDNA and the native DNA to which it responds are marked
differently, in function as well as in structure. Complementary DNA is
valuable in large part because its informational content - its sequence of
nucleotides - is identical to both its naturally occurring mRNA and exonic
native DNA counterparts; it is this identity that makes cDNA useful in gene
sequencing, medical diagnosis and other information-intensive applications. 346
Nonetheless, cDNA is also valuable for its unique physical properties,
which make cDNA functional in ways that its natural counterparts are not.
Genes are not just biological information and templates for copying that
information; they are also means for transferring information, much like a
compact disk.347 Because cDNA carries its genetic information in a way that is
different from either mRNA or native DNA, cDNA is often more effective in
introducing new genetic material to transform cells, in probing cellular
genomes, in performing directed gene deletions, and in measuring gene
expression. 348 Although the Myriad Court did not directly address these
differences in native DNA and cDNA function, they would seem to be more
than adequate in terms of artifice and action, particularly when combined with
the structural differences on which the Myriad Court focused.
By contrast, the Myriad Court found isolated DNA to be much more
problematic. 349 A rather generic term, isolated DNA can refer to a variety of
genetic forms, including naturally occurring genes or gene fragments extracted
directly from a cell, lab-created copies of such genes, and even cDNA. 350
343 Id.
3" Myriad I, 133 S. Ct. at 2111; Gregory Dolin, Exclusivity Without Patents: The New
Frontier of FDA Regulation for Genetic Materials, 98 IOWA L. REv. 1399, 1414 (2013).
345 Myriad 1l, 133 S. Ct. at 2117 (2013); Myriad 1, 689 F.3d at 1326. The Court noted
that retroviruses do produce cDNA copies of their own RNA, but the odds of naturally
occurring retroviral cDNA ever being identical in sequence to the BRCA I or 2 cDNA are
infinitesimally small. Myriad II, 133 S. Ct. at 2119 n.8; Myriad 1, 689 F.3d at 1356 n.5
(Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
346 Myriad I, 689 F.3d at 1340 (Moore, J., concurring in part); see also Kane, supra note
330, at 723, 742. Messenger RNA and cDNA use different bases (uracil instead of thymine,
respectively), but in informational content, the two bases are interchangeable.
347 Myriad l, 689 F.3d at 1340.
348 Id. at 1340-41 (Moore, J., concurring in part). But see id. at 1330 (suggesting that
patent eligibility looks only at structural, not functional, differences).
349 Myriad II, 133 S. Ct. at 2116-19.
350 E.g., Myriad I, 689 F.3d at 1326- 1328.
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Myriad's patents, however, make clear that the term "isolated DNA" included
DNA with "intervening sequences," thus distinguishing isolated DNA more
generally from cDNA, which contains no such intervening sequences. 351 As a
result, Myriad's claims to isolated DNA were broad enough to cover DNA that
is structurally almost identical to native DNA.
That is not to say that isolated DNA is not modified at all; before the
Supreme Court addressed Myriad, the Federal Circuit pointed out in its
majority opinion that the mere process of extracting native DNA entails not
only mechanical separation from its chromosome but also chemical alterations
to cleave the bonds between the extracted segment and the rest of the
genome. 352 Myriad's patent claims also covered laboratory-synthesized copies
of isolated DNA sequences, a factor that would seem to suggest artifice.353
Unlike the case with cDNA, however, the degree of structural identity between
even "synthetic" versions of isolated DNA and their native DNA counterparts
is so high that they possess insufficient artifice for patentability.
The Myriad Court also seemed to view isolated DNA as possessing
insufficient action, although the Court's views on this matter are arguably too
narrow. The Court described isolated DNA as if it were valuable solely for its
informational content, noting that Myriad claimed its isolated DNA not by its
chemical structure but rather by its informational content - i.e., by the
polypeptide sequences for which that DNA coded.354
Isolated DNA can serve significant non-informational functions as well,
however. For example, Myriad argued that DNA must be isolated in order to
be used as probes, primers, and a variety of other useful functions. 315 Isolated
DNA containing introns can perform better than cDNA in transforming certain
types of animal cells. 356 Furthermore, isolated genes can contain a number of
regulatory sequences, such as promoters, enhancers, and operators, which
serve not as information but as binding sites that control gene expression.357
Thus, much like cDNA, isolated DNA would seem to offer adequate patentable
action. Regardless of whether they display adequate action, however, the fact
remains that isolated DNA sequences do not display adequate artifice to be
'" See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282 (filed June 7, 1995).
352 Myriad 1, 689 F.3d at 1328-29; Utility Examination Guidelines, supra note 51.
35 See, e.g., '282 Patent.
354 Myriad II, 133 S. Ct. at 2118.
355 See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 46, Myriad II, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (No.
12-398). The claim language at issue in Myriad, however, was not limited to isolated DNA
in its tagged (and therefore more modified and functional) form. Myriad l, 689 F.3d at 1309.
356 Dolin, supra note 344, at 1415-16.
357 JEREMY W. DALE ET AL., FROM GENES TO GENOMES: CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS OF
DNA TECHNOLOGY 14 (3d ed. 2012); Andrew W. Torrance, Biology & Genetics: Gene
Concepts, Gene Talk, and Gene Patents, II MINN. J.L. Sci. & TECH. 157, 170 (2010). Claim
differentiation shows, however, that Myriad's use of the term "isolated DNA" does not
include these regulatory elements. See, e.g., '282 Patent (adding dependent claims including
"isolated DNA ... which contains BRCAI regulatory sequences.").
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patentable.358
The Court's opinion does not address oligonucleotides directly but strongly
suggests that in some ways they are simply a subset of isolated DNA. Because
Myriad's oligonucleotide claims were also broad enough to cover both intron
and exon fragments, moreover, the oligonucleotide claims could include short
cDNA sequences. The Court clearly viewed both types of oligonucleotide
sequences as unpatentable, presumably because of their structural near-identity
with their native DNA counterparts.
Unlike Judge Moore's concurrence in the Federal Circuit's decision in the
case, the Court never discussed whether oligonucleotides possess patentable
action. As Judge Moore noted, oligonucleotides offer "a variety of applications
and uses" that neither native nor isolated DNA possesses.35 9
Furthermore, unlike either cDNA or gene-length isolated DNA,
oligonucleotides are much less valuable for their informational content.360
DNA fragments from both expressed and non-expressed regions can be used to
detect single-nucleotide polymorphisms ("SNPs"), which are genetic variations
among individuals signifying ancestry, relatedness, gene mutations, and other
markers. 361 Identifying SNPs is a largely informative enterprise, but DNA
fragments can also be used for more non-informative purposes, including
duplication of DNA sequences, DNA vaccination against viruses and bacteria,
gene mapping, and blocking gene expression.362 Again, to say that
oligonucleotides possess adequate action does not resolve the issue, and the
Myriad Court clearly viewed oligonucleotides as possessing inadequate artifice
to be patentable.
Computer Software: Patenting computer software is a controversial issue,
with many scholars and jurists criticizing software patents as low quality,
unnecessary, ambiguous, and prone to litigation.363 Computers and, by logical
extension, computer software are widely regarded as "technological," but
much computer technology is "information technology;" that is, the storage,
retrieval, transmission, and manipulation of data.364 Again, if a computer
program or other innovation primarily functions to manipulate data or other
31 Myriad !I, 133 S. Ct. at 2117.
31 Myriad !, 689 F.3d 1303, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Moore, J., concurring in part).
361 Doll, supra note 331, at 689-90; Pui-Yan Kwok & Xiangning Chen, Detection of
Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms, 5 CURRENT ISSUES MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 43, 43 (2003).
362 Doll, supra note 331, at 689; Dolin, supra note 344, at 1415; Kwok & Chen, supra
note 361, at 44; Yu, supra note 55, at 667.
363 See generally, JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE 187-214
(2009); James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Lessons for Patent Policy from Empirical
Research on Patent Litigation, 9 LEWIs & CLARK L. REv. 1, 16 (2005); see also Chao, supra
note 243, at 424-25, 434 (citing critics of software patenting).
3" A DICTIONARY OF PHYSICS (John Daintith ed., 6th ed. 2009); see also AT&T Corp. v.
Excel Commc'ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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information, it is often dismissed as an unpatentable mental process, algorithm,
or abstract idea.365
The problem with computer software involves more than just whether it
directs a computer to do something other than store or manipulate information,
however. A higher-order concern is whether software, regardless of what it
directs a computer to accomplish, is itself just information or expression.
Software comprises what it essentially signs, symbols, and words used to
instruct computer function and, indeed, on this basis is often considered to be
copyrightable as a literary work.366 Outside of informing computer function,
however, software itself performs no function and serves no purpose. Some
early court decisions accordingly disallowed software claims under the printed-
matter doctrine. 367
The printed-matter doctrine does not adequately address the complexity of
computer software, however. The Federal Circuit has held that the printed-
matter doctrine applies only to printed characters intelligible to humans, not to
computers or other machines. 368 The distinction between computer-readable
and human-readable writings leaves much to be desired, as computer software
can be legible to both humans and machines, while other computer-readable
files, such as digitized novels, are clearly not patentable "technology." 369
Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit's refusal to apply the printed matter-doctrine
to software exemplifies courts' general disinclination to reject all computer
software as unpatentable subject matter.370 This discomfort stems from the fact
that software is not just printed characters or descriptive matter; software can
also be functional in enabling a computer to perform new tasks. Computer
software is therefore not a comfortable fit for either copyright or patent
protection.371 In some respects, software is just data and expression and
therefore inert, but in other respects, software effectively becomes a part of
computer and its functionality. 372 The patent system has therefore struggled
with whether software is patentable subject matter and what guidelines to use
365 See supra text accompanying note 248.
366 See Chiappetta, supra note 34, at 141-42.
367 See, e.g., Burk, supra note 34, at 141-42 (discussing In re Jones, 373 F.2d 1007
(C.C.P.A. 1967)).
368 In re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (quoting In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d
1395, 1399 (C.C.P.A. 1969)).
369 See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1243, 1249
(3d Cir. 1983); Collins, Semiotics 101, supra note 45, at 1390-92; see also MANUAL OF
PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 131, at § 2106.01.
370 See also Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3228 (2010); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409
U.S. 63, 72-73 (1972).
371 See generally Chiappetta, supra note 34; Karjala, Distinguishing Patent, supra note
35; Pamela Samuelson, Why Copyright Law Excludes Systems and Processes from the
Scope ofIts Protection, 85 TEx. L. REV. 1921 (2007).
372 Chiappetta, supra note 34, at 95.
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in making that decision.3 73
Consistent with the artifice-plus-action standard, the trend in software
patenting is to limit patentability to software that does more than simply
calculate, compute or display information or expression.3 74 Taking a cue from
courts' general approach to processes claimed as machines, patentability would
seem to require that both the software and the machine on which it operates be
part of an overall invention that possesses sufficient patentable action.375 For
example, on one end of the spectrum is Gottschalk v. Benson, in which the
Supreme Court rejected as unpatentable a method of programming a general-
purpose digital computer to convert signals from binary-coded decimal form
into pure binary form. The Court held that such a program accomplished
nothing other than calculating a mathematical algorithm and as such performed
no patentable function. 376 On the other end of the spectrum is Diamond v.
Diehr, in which the Court upheld the patentability of a rubber curing process
that used a programmed digital computer .377 Although what distinguished the
process over the prior art was the incorporation of a computer program for
constantly calculating the proper cure time for the rubber, the Court held that
the overall invention was "a physical and chemical process for molding
precision synthetic rubber products" and therefore patentable subject matter.3 78
The digital computer program was only a small part of the overall invention in
Diehr, but it was a meaningful part that improved the overall process. 79 In
between the two extremes set by Benson and Diehr are other cases involving
software, including Parker v. Flook, which looked like more than just a naked
mathematical algorithm but nonetheless overall did nothing more than provide
an alarm limit number. That is, Flook's invention performed little or no
patentable action. 380
To be entirely consistent with the artifice-plus-action standard, software that
is not a meaningful part of an otherwise patentably active invention should not
be patentable. For example, software is often claimed as embodied in a storage
3 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 219 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]he cases
considering the patentability of program-related inventions do not establish rules that enable
a conscientious patent lawyer to determine with a fair degree of accuracy which, if any,
program-related inventions will be patentable.").
374 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 595 (1978) (quoting In re Richman, 563 F.2d 1026,
1030 (1977)); Bancorp Servs. v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (citing SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1333 (Fed. Cir.
2010)).
37 See supra text accompanying notes 247-267.
376 Gotttschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972).
37 Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
378 Id. at 184 (emphasis added).
n7 Id. at 177-78.
380 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585, 589-90 (1978).
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medium under what is known as a Beauregard claim.381 A floppy diskette,
computer memory chip, or other medium itself is often separately patentable,
but simply adding software to the medium may not change the function of the
medium in any patentably novel way. Likewise, the storage medium may not
perform the recited function of the software in any patentably active way.3 82 In
these cases the printed-matter doctrine may not apply to exclude the
Beauregard claim as unpatentable subject matter, but the shortcomings are
very similar: in neither case does the stored content bear any meaningful
relationship to its storage medium. 383
Of course, to say that software is patentable subject matter when it serves as
an integral part of a patentably active invention as a whole is not to say that all
software warrants patent protection or that software patenting might not hinder
more progress than it promotes. 384 Again, some commentators argue that
software patents are overly broad and ambiguous because software is often
claimed functionally and not limited to any particular code. 385 Like gene
patents, however, much of the criticisms of software patenting could perhaps
be addressed by tightening the application of definiteness and the other
patentability requirementS386 or by employing other measures that ease the
potentially restrictive effects of software patents. 387
CONCLUSION
"Technology" seems like a simple term that everyone understands, at least
according to its everyday usage. What technology means when it comes to
patentable subject matter, however, is a question that has been debated
381 CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed Cir. 2011).
The Beauregard claim is named after the very brief opinion in In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d
1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995), in which the Federal Circuit seemed just to sign off on the PTO's
decision to accept such claims. CyberSource Corp., 654 F.3d at 1373; see generallyJohn R.
Thomas, Of Text, Technique, and the Tangible: Drafting Patent Claims Around Patent
Rules, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 219, 244-46 (1998) (discussing Beauregard
claims).
382 CyberSource Corp., 654 F.3d at 1375; Thomas, supra note 381, at 271-72.
383 See Chiapetta, supra note 34, at 147 & n.63; cf Cohen & Lemley, supra note 219, at
10 n.23 (criticizing new-machine doctrine by noting that merely adding new content to
existing devices is not necessarily patentable invention).
384 See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Software and Patent Scope: A Report from the Middle
Innings, 85 TEX. L. REv. 1627, 1633 (2007) (finding no evidence that patenting has hurt the
software industry); Stuart J. H. Graham & David C. Mowery, Software Patents: Good News
or Bad News?, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN FRONTIER INDUSTRIES: SOFTWARE
AND BIOTECHNOLOGY (ROBERT HAHN ED. 2005).
385 See generally Mark A. Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of Functional
Claiming, 2013 Wis. L. REv. 905 (2013).
386 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 363, at 187-214.
38 Cohen & Lemley, supra note 219, passim (advocating minor doctrinal changes to
ensure patents are enforceable without becoming overbroad).
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throughout patent law's history. Despite the complexity and confusion in
courts' repeated attempts to define patentable subject matter, there are two
surprisingly consistent concepts that define the vast majority of patentable
subject matter - the concepts of artifice and action.
Artifice is the quality of being created by humans, not by nature. Action is
the quality of actively behaving or operating. Together, artifice plus action
explain and, perhaps more importantly, unify the law on patentable subject
matter. The artifice-plus-action standard is not an economically driven one, nor
is it a standard that necessarily promotes "Progress in useful Arts," but it is
nonetheless remarkably consistent across time and across courts. An artifice-
plus-action standard may therefore bring greater transparency and clarity to
patentable subject matter doctrine.
